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ABSTRACT 
The United States invaded Iraq in 2003 to compel compliance with UN 
disarmament mandates.  The invasion exposed the lack of a standing organization to 
conduct WMD elimination as a serious capability gap in the U.S. military force structure.  
This thesis demonstrates why it is necessary to establish such a capability.  It argues that 
the United States cannot rely solely on multilateral, cooperative approaches to eliminate a 
determined adversary’s weapons program.  While non-coercive tactics are preferred, the 
mixed results of twelve-years of UN verification in Iraq show that a viable threat of force 
must accompany these approaches in order to induce compliance with UN Security 
Council disarmament mandates.  Additionally, the U.S. elimination effort in Iraq 
demonstrated that ad hoc approaches inadequately address this capability shortfall.  The 
lack of integrated training, unsecured sites because of inadequate prioritization, and 
misaligned intelligence assets are just some of the problems that occurred during the ad 
hoc OPERATION IRAQI FREEDOM elimination operation.  When cooperative, 
nonproliferation measures fail to rollback aggressor states’ WMD programs, DoD must 
have the capability to compel compliance if called upon.  This thesis makes 
recommendations to facilitate the development of a viable and sustainable WMD 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
On April 6, 1991, Iraq unconditionally accepted the terms of the United Nations 
Security Council (UNSC) Resolution 6871.  The stipulations of UNSC Resolution 687, 
section C required Iraq to “unconditionally accept the destruction, removal, or rending 
harmless under international supervision of all chemical and biological weapons and 
stocks; all ballistic missiles with ranges greater than 150 kilometers.”2  The resolution 
required Iraq to declare the locations, amounts, and types of such items and established a 
system of ongoing monitoring and verification of Iraq’s compliance with the ban on these 
weapons and missiles.  Furthermore, paragraph 9 (b) authorized the establishment of a 
UN Special Commission (UNSCOM) to “carry out immediate on-site inspections of 
Iraq’s biological, chemical, and missile capabilities based on Iraq’s declarations and any 
other locations that UNSCOM may deem worthy of inspection.3  The terms imposed by 
the UN manifested new arms control dynamics, marking the first time in the history of 
the United Nations that a state was compelled under the threat of force to rollback its 
WMD program.  
Rolf Ekéus, the first Executive Chairman of UNSCOM, assembled an ad hoc 
team of inspectors and began inspection of Iraqi sites on June 9, 1991.  However, after 
years of opposition to the inspections on October 31, 1998, Iraq ceased all cooperation 
with UNSCOM and declared a halt to all future inspections and monitoring activities.  
Iraq contended that the United States was using the UNSCOM inspection regime for 
intelligence-gathering purposes.4  Inspections would later resume for 16 weeks under the 
                                                 
1  United Nations Security Council Resolution 687 was adopted at the 2981st meeting on April 3, 1991.  
It declared a formal cease-fire at the end of the Gulf War and imposed peace terms on Iraq.  It was passed 
by 12 votes to one (Cuba) with two abstentions (Ecuador and Yemen). 
2  United Nations Security Resolution 687, April 3, 1991.  
http://www.stte.gov/p/nea/rls/01fs/14906.htm  (accessed  December 15, 2005). 
3  Ibid. 
4  Trevor Findlay, “The Lessons of UNSCOM and UNMOVIC,” in   The Verification Yearbook 2003, 
(London: VERTIC, 2003), 67.  Also available online at   
http://www.vertic.org/publications/verification%20yearbook.html (accessed June 19, 2006). 
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auspices of Security Council Resolution 1284, which replaced UNSCOM with the UN 
Monitoring, Verification, and Inspection Commission (UNMOVIC).   
UNMOVIC conducted 750 inspections at over 500 different sites and although it 
found a few items that were undeclared by Iraq, its findings were unable to satisfy the 
governments of the United States and Great Britain. 5    In 2003, despite the Security 
Council’s unwillingness to act, the United States led a “coalition of the willing” to 
compel Iraq’s compliance with the UN disarmament mandate.6  Having no standing 
capability to conduct WMD elimination, however, the Department of Defense (DoD) had 
to develop this capability ad hoc from its existing force structure.  
This thesis proposes that the DoD must develop a permanent WMD elimination 
capability that is both viable and sustainable in response to the dynamics of the current 
arms control paradigm.  Iraq’s forced compliance with UN mandates to disarm serves as 
the paradigm case for arms control because of three elements: cheating by a treaty 
signatory, the levying of the United Nations Security Council mandate, and the rejection 
of the international norms denouncing WMD.7  The U.S.-led invasion of Iraq in 2003 
further solidified this new arms control paradigm.  In light of this, the National Military 
Strategy (NMS) for Combating WMD asserts that U.S. military forces must be prepared 
to dissuade, deter, defend, and defeat adversaries seeking to use WMD against U.S. 
interests.  Towards this end, it delineates eight missions that the U.S. military must have 
the capacity to accomplish in combating WMD.  These missions are passive defense, 
threat reduction cooperation, security cooperation and partner activities, interdiction 
operations, active defense, WMD consequence management, and WMD elimination.8  As 
an adversary’s determination to posses WMD increase, options available to U.S. 
leadership become more limited, (see Figure 1).  Of these eight missions, WMD 
                                                 
5  Sharon A. Squassoni, Iraq: UN Inspections for Weapons of Mass Destruction, (Washington D.C: 
Congressional Research Service, 2003),  2.  
6  Ibid.    
7  J. Peter Scoblic, “The Lessons and Legacy of UNSCOM: An Interview with Ambassador Richard 
Butler,” Arms Control Today 29, no. 5 (June 1999), http://www.armscontrol.org/act/1999_06/rbjun99.asp. 
December 3, 2004). 
8  DoD, National Military Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction, December 2002, 
http://www.defenselink.mil/pdf/NMS-CWMD2006.pdf.  (accessed July 2, 2006), 22.   
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elimination is the ultimate operation because the extensive military and political 
ramifications involved.  It includes all operations to systematically locate, characterize, 
secure, disable, and/or destroy a State or non-State actor’s WMD program and related 
capabilities in a hostile or uncertain environment.9  Until DoD has integrated and 
institutionalized WMD elimination into the mission scope of U.S. forces, its ability to 
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Figure 1: WMD Nonproliferation and Counterproliferation Missions (After Ref. 8).  
As an adversary’s determination to possess WMD increases, the mitigating options 
available to prevent an adversary from possessing WMD become limited. 
 
DoD relied on ad hoc measures to conduct the elimination mission in Iraq.  Since 
Iraq had no WMD to eliminate, assessing the effectiveness (or ineffectiveness) of the ad 
hoc effort in Iraq is difficult.  Nevertheless, there are numerous indicators that strongly 
                                                 
9  DoD, National Military Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction, 23.   
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suggest that the United States should develop a permanent capability to conduct such 
elimination missions.  Recognizing this shortfall, DoD expanded the mission scope of the 
Army’s 20th Support Command (CBRNE) designating it as the rapid deployment Joint 
Task Force to provide command and control of WMD elimination operations.10  This 
thesis, however, asserts that a comprehensive approach to addressing the weapons 
elimination challenges must also include integrating and institutionalizing operational-
level arms control.  Until DoD integrates and institutionalizes WMD elimination, this 
critical gap will continue to exist.  Continued reliance on ad hoc approaches to conduct 
this mission could jeopardize the security of the United States, its allies, and its forces 
stationed abroad.  Although the United States has not conducted a counterproliferation 
mission since World War II, the post-September 11 security environment dictates that 
DoD must be prepared to meet these responsibilities if required.   
 
A. BACKGROUND 
  In support of Operation Iraqi Freedom, the Department of Defense (DoD) created 
three ad hoc organizations to conduct WMD exploitation and site assessments.  These 
organizations were Task Force 20 (TF-20), the 75th Exploitation Task Force (XTF), and 
the Iraqi Survey Group (ISG).  Task Force 20 was a covert pre-invasion team charged 
with uncovering Iraq’s WMD stockpiles and denying its use against invading coalition 
forces.11  DoD fashioned the 75th XTF from the 75th Field Artillery Brigade commanded 
by Colonel Richard McPhee.  Its purpose was to provide the command and control for the 
WMD elimination mission during Operation Iraqi Freedom.  The Iraqi Survey Group 
(ISG) was the third and most ambitious of these ad hoc organizations.  Major General 
Keith W. Dayton, a senior manager with the Defense Intelligence Agency, headed the 
organization.  DoD formed the ISG based on an assessment that the 75th XTF was not 
robust enough for the elimination mission.  Although these organizations failed to  
 
                                                 
10  Quadrennial Defense Review Report, February 6, 2006, 52. 
11  Frank R. Cleminson, “What Happened to Saddam’s Weapons of Mass Destruction?,  Arms Control 
Today 33, no. 7 (September 2003), http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2003_09/Cleminson_09.asp. (accessed 
December 25, 2005).   
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discover any WMD in Iraq, DoD cannot access this effort as a failure.  There were 
numerous lessons learned from the planning, training and execution of Operation Iraqi 
Freedom’s (OIF) WMD elimination mission.  
 The 75th Exploitation Task Force conducted the brunt of OIF’s WMD elimination 
mission.  Its elimination concept consisted of three primary tasks—
assessment/exploitation, destruction, and monitoring.  The assessment/exploitation task 
has two phases.  During phase I of assessment/exploitation, the objectives were to locate, 
identify, and isolate suspected WMD.  The phase II objectives were to secure/disable the 
WMD cache and use appropriate steps to avoid its use against friendly forces or its 
exposure to non-combatants.  The second task, destruction, entails safely and verifiably 
disposing of an adversary’s WMD cache, means of production, equipment, or 
infrastructure.12  The final task of the 75th’s WMD elimination plan was ongoing 
monitoring and inspections.  This entailed the continuous or periodic observation and 
inspection as required to prevent reconstitution of an adversaries WMD program.  Non-
DoD government agencies, possibly assisted by DoD, would have been responsible for 
this step.        
Of the three WMD elimination phases that comprised the OIF elimination 
concept, assessment/exploitation was the most crucial—particularly in a non-permissive 
environment.  It circumscribed and facilitated the other WMD elimination tasks.  
Assessment/exploitation teams faced such concerns as booby-trapped entrances, looters, 
and the vandalistic dissemination of chemical, biological, or radiological agents.  The 
teams integrated methods of mitigating such hazards into their operating procedures 
thereby forging a valuable knowledge base of WMD elimination under non-permissive 
conditions.  In future operations to combat WMD, the U.S. military may only play only a 
supporting role to other U.S. government agencies or non-government organizations.  
Nonetheless, under nonpermissive conditions U.S. military forces will most likely be 
responsible for conducting the initial exploitation and securing of an adversary’s weapons 
                                                 
12  Rebecca K.C. Hersman and Todd M. Koca, “Eliminating Adversary WMD: Lessons for Future 
Conflicts,” Strategic Forum 211(October 2004), 4 
http://www.ndu.edu/inss/strforum/SF211/SF211_Final.pdf.  (accessed June 25, 2006).   
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program.  Developing, integrating, and institutionalizing the WMD elimination mission 
will enable DoD to establish a viable and sustainable elimination capability.  
 
B. SIGNIFICANCE OF THE ISSUE 
In a speech presented at West Point, New York on June 1, 2002, President George 
W. Bush stated that “the greatest danger our nation faces lies at the crossroads of 
radicalism and technology…history will judge harshly those who saw this coming 
danger, but failed to act.” 13  The National Security Strategy assessment released in 2002 
states that the United States must be prepared to stop rogue states and terrorist clients 
before they are able to employ WMD against the United States or its allies.  The milieu 
produced by Bush’s policy of preemption and the subsequent invasion of Iraq exposed a 
critical capabilities gap.  That gap is the reliance on ad hoc efforts to conduct WMD 
elimination missions.   
On May 4, 2003, former Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz stated: 
In future conflicts we should not end up playing “pick-up games” when 
we are trying to put together forces for eliminating Weapons of Mass 
Destruction in the aftermath of a conflict.  We must ensure that there are 
sufficient forces in peacetime, adequately trained, organized and equipped 
for the mission…but also ensure that they are well equipped and personnel 
have the proper concepts, doctrine, and training to use those capabilities 
effectively to accomplish their mission.14 
The OIF counterproliferation mission met stiff resistance at the United Nations 
due to the uncertainty of Iraq’s WMD programs.  Despite over ten years of inspections 
under permissive condition and intensive intelligence gathering, there was still no 
consensus of the state of Iraq’s WMD program.  President Bushed moved for military 
action against Iraq for failing to comply with the UN mandates to disarm.  The United 
Nations requested that President Bush allow more time for UNMOVIC to complete its 
                                                 
13  National Security Strategy of the United States.  April 2002, 13 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nss.pdf#search=%222002%20national%20security%20strategy%22 
(accessed June 20, 2006).  
14  Paul Wolfowitz, Speech at National Defense University Conference on Counterproliferation, May 
13, 2003,  http://www.defenselink.mil/speeches/2003/sp20030513-depsecdef0203.html (accessed June  20, 
2006). 
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inspections, but President Bush refused.15  Subsequently, the failure of the United States 
to find WMD in Iraq gives validity to claims that the United Nations’ soft WMD 
elimination efforts in Iraq had actually been successful.  
In September 2002, during an interview on CNN regarding the U.S. position on 
Iraq’s WMD program, the National Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice made a very 
fateful statement.  She said, “…there will always be some uncertainty” in determining 
Iraq’s nuclear status.  Dr. Rice went on to state, “We don’t want the smoking gun to be a 
mushroom cloud.”16  When deterrence fails, U.S leaders should have the option to reduce 
uncertainty and place an adversary’s WMD program in jeopardy.  Once U.S. leadership 
makes the political decision that a zero degree of uncertainty is required, it is important 
that military assets are fully capable of accomplishing the mission.  Eliminating WMD of 
an uncooperative adversary to a near zero degree of uncertainty, requires the proverbial 
“boots on the ground” strategy.17     
U.S. forces must be able to conduct weapons elimination in support of 
counterproliferation missions across the spectrum of operational environments and 
integrate the lessons learned during OIF into its institutional knowledge base.18  DoD 
should address this shortfall by establishing a permanent capability to conduct 
counterproliferation missions across the spectrum of operational environments.  Failure 
to develop a viable and sustainable WMD elimination capability could have catastrophic 
                                                 
15  Richard Spertzel, “More Time,” National Review Online, January 24, 2003, 
http://www.nationalreview.com/comment/comment-spertzel012403.asp.  (accessed April 14, 2006).  
16  CNN Achieves, “Top Bush officials Push Case Against Saddam,”   
http://archives.cnn.com/2002/ALLPOLITICS/09/08/iraq.debate/  (accessed February 4, 2006).  
17  Counterforce operations  refers to offensive operation directed at defeating an adversary’s WMD 
before employment against friendly forces or interests.   It does entail  the systemic destruction that 
characterizes WMD elimination operation. 
18  In general, the Defense and Justice Departments conducts counterproliferation while 
nonproliferation is generally a responsibility of the State Department.  This distinction is important to this 
paper because of the opaqueness between their functions.  Joint publication 1-02, DoD Dictionary of 
Military and Associated Terms defines counterproliferation as “those actions taken to defeat the threat 
and/or use of WMD against the United States, our military forces, friends, and allies (e.g., detect and 
monitor, prepare to conduct counterproliferation operations, offensive operations, WMD, active defense, 
and passive defense).”  It defines nonproliferation as “those actions taken to prevent the proliferation of 
weapons of mass destruction by dissuading or impeding access to, or distribution of, sensitive technologies, 
material, and expertise (e.g., diplomacy, arms control, multilateral agreements, threat reduction assistance, 
and export controls.).”  
  8
consequences.  Continuing to rely on ad hoc approaches to weapons elimination could 
enable an adversary to conceal its weapons cache—effectively nullifying preemptive 
efforts.  The adversary could then deploy these weapons against U.S. forces or other 
interests at time and place of his choosing with destructive consequences.  The 
implications are clearer, if one imagines the impact of Iraqi insurgents obtaining chemical 
agents or disbursing a radiological hazard in the post-war insurgency.   
 
C. PREVAILING PERSPECTIVES 
 Barry R. Schneider, director of the U.S. Air Force Counterproliferation Center 
advocates that the United States should have a strong military option available to destroy 
an adversary’s WMD stockpiles.  In his article entitled “Radical Responses to Radical 
Regimes”, Schneider noted that preemptive strikes might be the best option when all 
other options are ineffective.  In a later essay entitled “Progress in Counterforce”, he 
discusses advances that enable the United States to defeat, disrupt, and deny an adversary 
the use of WMD.  He states that systems such as unmanned aerial vehicles with 
surveillance and offensive capabilities, stealth aircraft, and precision guided low yield 
munitions have improved the ability to conduct counterforce strikes against WMD 
assets.19   
 While Schneider makes a very cogent point on the U.S. counterforce capability, 
there is too little emphasis on the fact that air strikes, while accurate, may not decrease 
the “degree of uncertainty” to an acceptable level.  This is especially the case considering 
the lessons potential adversaries gather from military actions such as the Israeli 1981 
Osirak strike and the U.S. strikes against deeply buried sites in Afghanistan during 
Operation Enduring Freedom.  The technology and skills related to constructing hardened 
and deeply buried sites is spreading; enabling adversaries to become adroit at hiding and 
                                                 
19  Barry Schneider and Jim A. Davis, “Progress in Counterforce,” in Avoiding the Abyss:  Progress, 
Shortfalls, and the Way Ahead in Combating the WMD Threat, 2d ed.  (Westport Connecticut: Praeger 
Security International, 2005) 165-166.   
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protecting their assets from non-invasive counterforce air strikes.  Analysts suspected that 
North Korea and Iran are using these tactics to mitigate counterforce air strikes.20       
England’s Dr Trevor Findlay is the Executive Director of the Verification 
Research, Training, and Information Centre (VERTIC).  He is the editor of , Verification 
Yearbook 2004, which offers a detailed analysis of the lessons learned during the 
UNSCOM and UNMOVIC inspections from both an institutional and a technical 
perspective.21  It discusses procedural and strategic changes the UN implemented during 
the UNMOVIC mission because of the lessons learned during UNSCOM.  Ambassador 
Richard Butler’s presentation to the UN Security Council on June 3, 1998 provides a 
comprehensive report on UNSCOM’s assessment efforts in Iraq.  Additionally, Butler’s 
interview in Arms Control Today offers insightful retrospectives on the UNSCOM 
mission.22  Its commentary provides excellent insight on how the Iraq disarmament case 
shapes the future of arms control.   
 Literature assessing the U.S. failure to find WMD in Iraq is abundant; however, 
there is a dearth of information assessing the arms control capability gap evident during 
the WMD elimination operation in Iraq.  Rebecca Hersman’s of the Center for the Study 
of Weapons of Mass Destruction at the National Defense University article advocating 
the creation of a permanent elimination capability.  Hersman discusses the need for DoD 
to develop a permanent WMD elimination capability in support the growing possibility 
that U.S. forces may once again be called up to conduct another WMD elimination 
operation.  23   
                                                 
20  Philip C. Saunders, “Military Options for Dealing with North Korea’s Nuclear Program,” MIIS: 
Center for Nonproliferation Studies (2003), http://cns.miis.edu/research/korea/dprkmil.htm (accessed June 
20, 2006).  Also, Paul Kerr, “Reports Grow That U.S. Plots Strike Against Iran,” Arms Control Today 36, 
no. 4 (May 2006), http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2006_05/iranreports.asp (accessed June 20, 2006).   
21  Trevor Findlay, “The Lessons of UNSCOM and UNMOVIC,” in   The Verification Yearbook 2003, 
(London: VERTIC, 2003).  
22  J. Peter Scoblic, “The Lessons and Legacy of UNSCOM: An Interview with Ambassador Richard 
Butler.” 
23  Rebecca K.C. Hersman, “Eliminating Adversary Weapons of Mass Destruction:  What’s at Stake?” 
Occasional Paper 1, National Defense University: Center for the Study of Weapons of Mass Destruction,  
(December 2004) http://www.ndu.edu/WMDCenter/docUploaded/NDU_OCPapers.pdf.  18-22.    
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American Barbra Hatch Rosenberg, Chair of the Arms Control Center Scientists 
Working Group on Biological and Chemical Weapons, wrote an article published in the 
Journal of Disarmament Diplomacy advocating the establishment of a permanent 
capability to enforce the UN nonproliferation resolutions.24  Rosenberg’s position is that 
the United Nation should establish a permanent nonproliferation commission rather than 
using a situational approach like UNSCOM or UNMOVIC.  At the time of publication, 
Rosenberg was serving as the Chair of the Arms Control Center Scientist Working Group 
on Biological and Chemical Weapons.  While her position is not without merit, this thesis 
argues that DoD must develop its own standing capability to combat WMD elimination.  
This U.S. capability will compliment any cooperative verification capability developed 
by the United Nations. 
Synthesizing both Rosenberg’s and Hersman’s arguments, John Wolfsthal, an 
associate at the Carnegie Nonproliferation Project, recognized the importance of 
balancing the efforts of a nonproliferation regime with a capable counterproliferation 
force.  Wolfsthal discusses the continued proliferation of WMD programs, specifically in 
the Middle East.  He concluded that the willingness exhibited by the United States to take 
aggressive action is not dissuading foreign nations from continuing their pursuit of 
WMD.  Wolfsthal discusses the fact that many nations now attempt to protect their 
programs by hiding them underground.  If successful, their possession of WMD could 
make counterproliferation too costly.25  
 
D. THESIS ARGUMENT 
The argument of this thesis is that the United States should develop a viable and 
sustainable WMD elimination capability to eliminate adversaries WMD program.  This 
will require a synergistic approach that encompasses integrating WMD elimination into 
the mission scope of U.S. forces and institutionalizing the mission as a core competency  
                                                 
24  Barbara Hatch Rosenberg, “Enforcing WMD Treaties: Consolidating a UN Role,” The Acronym 
Institute for Disarmament Diplomacy:  Journal of Disarmament Diplomacy, 75 (January/February 2004), 
http://www.acronym.org.uk/dd/dd75/75bhr.htm (accessed June 20, 2006).  
25  Jonathan M.  Wolfsthal, “The WMD Proliferation Threat,” in Avoiding the Abyss: Progress, 
Shortfalls, and the Way Ahead in Combating the WMD Threat, ed. Barry R. Schneider and Jim A. Davis 
(Westport, CT:  Greenwood Publishing Group, 2005) 58-60. 
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within the military force structure.  While multilateral efforts hold much promise, the 
U.S. must maintain a capability to conduct unilateral coercive disarmament of its 
adversaries without relying on ad hoc approaches.   
The terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, served to solidify the new arms 
control paradigm that was ushered in with the UN’s disarmament of Iraq after the 1991 
Persian Gulf War.  The post-September 11 expanded definition of arms control has a 
more operational vice strategic spin.  Unlike the traditional view, it is not necessarily 
between two equals.  DoD defines arms control as: 
a concept that connotes: a. any plan, arrangement, or process, resting upon 
explicit or implicit international agreement, governing any aspect of the 
following: the numbers, types, and performance characteristics of weapon 
systems (including the command and control, logistics support 
arrangements, and any related intelligence-gathering mechanism); and the 
numerical strength, organization, equipment, deployment, or employment 
of the Armed Forces retained by the parties (it encompasses disarmament); 
and b. on some occasions, those measures taken for the purpose of 
reducing instability in the military environment.26 
  UN Security Council Resolution (UNSC) 687, epitomizes today’s arms control 
paradigm.  Other multilateral cooperative measures and actions such as the adaptation of 
UN Resolution 1540, the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI); and the ongoing 
diplomatic efforts aimed at preventing North Korea and Iran from expanding their 
nuclear capability also mark the new face of arms control—each having a potential 
impact on U.S. military forces.  This potential military involvement was uncharacteristic 
in the previous paradigm.  National leaders may call upon U.S. military forces to conduct 
disarmament operations in support of bilateral disarmament agreements, UN mandates, 
unilateral decisions, or as part of ongoing stability operations.  U.S. military forces must 
be prepared to conduct disarmament operations under both permissive and non-
permissive conditions.  The absence of a capability to conduct operational disarmament, 
however, is evident by the ad hoc approach DoD used in preparing to conduct 
disarmament operations against Iraq in 2003.     
                                                 
26  DoD Dictionary of Military Terms (April 2006), http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/doddict/ 
(accessed June 2, 2006). 
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Notwithstanding the fact that the United States found no weapons in Iraq, rouge 
states and non-state actors aspiring to obtain WMD must now recognize and account for 
the U.S. preemptive doctrine.  While this may have a deterrent value, it will also motivate 
determined states to design, build, and operate their WMD programs in a manner 
designed to mitigate U.S. counterproliferation efforts creating an interdiction learning 
curve (see figure 1).  The need for a standing WMD elimination capability if further 
substantiated by the fact the using nuclear weapons to destroy hardened and deeply 

















Figure 2: Interdiction Learning Curve.  Determined states will learn from 
preemptive counterforce operations—against it or other states—and make adjustments 
until it reaches its desired WMD capability. 
 
Three broad counterarguments exist to the position that DoD should develop a 
permanent WMD elimination capability in support of the current operational arms control 
requirements.  The first is that developing this additional force requirement may not be 
cost effective considering the probability of conducting another OPERATION IRAQI 
FREEDOM-like operation.  The fact is, however, that most of the potential adversaries of 
the United States either possess weapons of mass destruction or have the capacity to 
produce them.  Additionally, there in the threat from non-state actors operating within 
failed states.  U.S. military forces must be capable of conducting elimination operations if 
called upon by national leaders.  With potential adversaries becoming increasingly adroit 
at building hardened and deeply buried sites, the need for a viable and sustainable  
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elimination option is increasing.  Continuing to rely on ad hoc approaches to conduct this 
critical mission leaves U.S. military forces unprepared and unable to fulfill a critical 
function required for national security. 
The second counterargument is that the United States can rely on the United 
Nations to conduct operational arms control.  Retrospectively, considering the success of 
UNSCOM, one can make a case that the United States should be more reliant on UN 
nonproliferation regimes.  What this counterargument fails to address is that as the 
world’s only superpower, the international community expects the United States to 
enforce internationally imposed mandates.  Additionally, the United Nations failed to 
confirm that Iraq had effectively complied with its disarmament mandate after ten years 
of inspections under the UNSCOM/UNMOVIC regimes.  If political leaders decide that 
it is in the unilateral interest to strike preemptively and conduct WMD elimination under 
nonpermissive conditions, then DoD has a responsibility to maintain a force structure 
capable of accomplishing this mission.   
Yet another counterargument to developing a standing WMD elimination 
capability is the efficiency of counterforce air strikes.  Counterforce air strikes are 
precise, carry far less operational risk, and have fewer political connotations than 
committing ground forces to conduct an elimination mission.  In 1981, Israel successfully 
preempted Saddam Hussein’s nuclear aspirations when it struck Iraq’s Osirak nuclear 
reactor at the Al Tuwaitha Nuclear Research Centre.  Such counterforce operations, 
however, require detailed intelligence that may not be accurate.  Short of using nuclear 
weapons, the success of preemptive strikes can be difficult to access.  Anticipating 
preemptive attacks, adversaries may construct hardened and deeply buried underground 
facilities, redundant programs, or set up dummy facilities.  Furthermore, the use of 
nuclear weapons to annihilate these programs may cause an international moral backlash 
against the United States.  It may also solidify an adversary’s tentative domestic backing 
for its WMD program and garner increased international sympathy towards its objectives.  
Future counterproliferation operations may require a zero degree of uncertainty 
regarding the destruction of an adversary’s WMD programs.  A counterforce air strike is 
an integral option when planning counterproliferation operations.  Military planners may 
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even incorporate counterforce strikes as part of a WMD elimination operation.  The 
increasing ability of adversaries to conceal WMD production facilities and storage caches 
will mitigate the effectiveness of counterforce air strikes.  There is also the risk of 
accidental exposure to noncombatants and friendly forces.  Counterforce air strikes  
will undoubtedly remain a primary counterproliferation option.  Nonetheless, it is 
imperative that DoD posses a unilateral standing WMD elimination capability that does 
not rely on a “pick-up game” approach 
 
E. PREVIEW 
The purpose of this thesis is to propel the debate regarding the necessity of 
establishing, integrating, and institutionalizing a standing capability to conduct WMD 
elimination mission across the spectrum of operational environments.  Toward that 
objective, Chapter II “The UN Verification Effort in Iraq, 1991–2003,” assesses the 
failure of the United Nations to confirm Iraq’s compliance with UN mandates.  It 
proposes that the UN-led soft WMD elimination model used in Iraq was a cooperative 
endeavor incapable of withstanding non-cooperative behavior.  Therefore, from the initial 
indication that Iraq was practicing deception and denial tactics, the legitimacy declined.    
Chapter II addresses the question of why the United States cannot rely on UN-led, 
cooperative WMD elimination.  It asserts that although these cooperative efforts are the 
preferred method of eliminating an adversary’s WMD, the DoD must be prepared to 
conduct elimination operations.  It starts with an overview of UNSCOM strategy, 
objectives, and structure.  Next, it examines the challenges circumstances surrounding the 
transition from UNSCOM to UNMOVIC.  Thirdly, this chapter analysis the 
insurmountable challenges that transcended both UNSCOM and UNMOVIC.  It 
concludes with an assessment of why the United States cannot rely on cooperative WMD 
elimination used by the UN to verify that Iraq was complying with UN disarmament 
mandates.      
Chapter III, “A Capability Gap Exposed: U.S. Counterproliferation in Iraq, 2003–
2004,” addresses the question of why the United States cannot rely on ad hoc approaches 
to WMD elimination.  It asserts that both the novelty of the mission and the ad hoc 
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approach DoD employed in conducting the WMD elimination operation contributed to 
many of the problems associated with the OPERATION IRAQI FREEDOM (OIF) WMD 
elimination operation.  It examines DoD’s formulation of the WMD elimination plan for 
Operation Iraqi Freedom and looks at U.S. Central Command’s (CENTCOM) strategy 
for conducting weapons exploitation in conjunction with the warfight.  The chapter also 
discusses the capability shortfalls and challenges faced by the exploitation forces, lack of 
integrated training, and its integration with combat forces.  It also discusses the changes 
that occurred in the elimination effort as the mission transition from the 75th XTF to the 
ISG.  Chapter III captures some the significant lessons learned from the OIF WMD 
elimination operation and exposes the risks of continued reliance on ad hoc measures. 
Chapter IV, “Establishing a Viable and Sustainable WMD Elimination 
Capability,” discusses the current U.S. strategy to combat WMD.  It first examines the 
measures instituted by DoD since the OIF WMD elimination operation.  Secondly, it 
forwards recommendations on how DoD can integrate the elimination mission into the 
mission scope of U.S. forces at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels.  This chapter 
then discusses how DoD could institutionalize WMD elimination by embedding it as a 
core competency within the U.S. Army proponents primarily responsible for conducting 
the technical tasks associated with the elimination mission.  Finally, it delineates some of 
the significant challenges that DoD must overcome in order to establish a viable and 
sustainable WMD elimination capability.  
Chapter V reviews some of the key discussion and finding of this thesis.  It also 
summarizes recommendations for DoD to establish a viable and sustainable WMD 
elimination capability.  The chapter closes with some final thoughts on WMD elimination 
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II. THE UN VERIFICATION EFFORT, 1991–2003:  THE 
LIMITATIONS OF COMPELLED COMPLIANCE 
A. INTRODUCTION   
On April 6, 1991, Iraq accepted the terms of United Nations Security Council 
(UNSC) Resolution 687.  The terms required Iraq to “unconditionally accept the 
destruction, removal, or rendering harmless under international supervision of all 
chemical and biological weapons and stocks; [and] all ballistic missiles with ranges 
greater than 150 kilometer.”27  Furthermore, paragraph 9 (b) of the resolution authorize 
the establishment of UNSCOM to “carry out immediate on-site inspection of Iraq’s 
biological, chemical, and missile capabilities” based on Iraq’s declarations and any other 
locations designated by UNSCOM.28   
UNSCOM started inspections on June 9, 1991, however, on October 31, 1998; 
Iraq ceased all cooperation with UNSCOM and halted future inspection and monitoring 
activities.29  Inspections would later resume for a short period under the auspices of the 
Security Council Resolution 1284 that established UNMOVIC, replacing UNSCOM.30  
UNSCOM and UNMOVIC marked the first time in the history of the United Nations that 
international society had implemented such intrusive measures with the purpose of 
compelling a state to rollback its weapons of mass destruction (WMD).  Despite Iraq’s 
initial agreement to disarm and the creation of a special regime to ensure compliance, in 
February 2003 the U.S. government determined that it was in its security interest to lead 
an invasion of Iraq to deny Saddam Hussein weapons of mass destruction  
After the United States failed to find the “smoking gun” proving Iraq had a viable 
WMD program, many criticized the invasion and pointed out that the UN inspection 
                                                 
27  United Nations Security Resolution 687, April 3, 1991.  
http://www.stte.gov/p/nea/rls/01fs/14906.htm  (accessed December 15, 2005).  
28  Ibid.  
29  United Nations Security Council Resolution 1205, November 5, 1998 
http://www.state.gov/p/nea/rls/01fs/14906.htm  (November 22, 2005).  
30  United Nations Security Council Resolution 1284, December 17, 1999 
http://www.state.gov/p/nea/rls/01fs/14906.htm  (accessed November 22, 2005).  
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regimes had eliminated Iraq’s WMD programs making the invasion unnecessary.  While 
this ex post observation certainly has its merits, it does not account for the fact that the 
United Nations had over ten years to verify the elimination of Iraq’s WMD but failed to 
do so.  The failure of the UN to step up and unequivocally state that Iraq had complied 
with UN mandates left room for doubt that Iraq still possessed its arsenal in defiance of 
UN Resolution 687.  The mere fact the UN regime could not close out the inspection 
process indicates a systemic problem with the inspection regime.   
Why did the United States view an invasion of Iraq as being necessary to its 
security interest?  Could a UN led inspection/verification regime have ever achieved an 
acceptable level of disarmament considering the U.S. hypersensitivity to the “radicalism–
technology nexus” pitted against the indifference of the other Security Council 
members?31  This chapter addresses these questions as it explains why the United States 
should not totally rely on the cooperative endeavors of the United Nations to conduct 
counterproliferation missions, but should instead integrate and institutionalize the WMD 
elimination mission in support of its strategy to combat WMD.   
This chapter proposes that the  UN’s soft WMD elimination efforts in Iraq was a 
cooperative enterprise requiring total cooperation, therefore, it does not represent a 
reliable model for conducting counterproliferation.  It begins with a discussion of the 
structure, strategy, and objectives of the UN inspection regimes in Iraq.  It examines the 
transition from UNSCOM to UNMOVIC assessing what drove the change how the focus 
and strategy of the inspection regime changed.  Next, the chapter evaluates the challenges 
transcending both regimes and accentuates an argument that the United States must 
develop a competent WMD elimination capability in support of the national strategy to 
combat WMD.  Finally, it categorizes the UN effort in Iraq within the context of the U.S. 
military strategy to combat WMD.  In conclusion, the chapter will counter the position  
                                                 
31  In the 2002 National Security Strategy there is an excerpt from a speech presented by President 
George W. Bush in West Point, New York on June 1, 2002.  In the speech, President Bush refers to 
“crossroad of radicalism and technology” as the gravest danger to freedom.  
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that the United States can rely on the UN’s cooperative model for effective 
counterproliferation arguing that it is too constrained by the deceptive acts of a 
determined adversary.  
 
B. UNSCOM STRATEGY, OBJECTIVES, AND STRUCTURE 
The strategy of UNSC Resolution 687 was to promote peace and stability in the 
Middle East by ridding Iraq—the most aggressive country in the Middle East—of its 
WMD holdings and delivery means.32  The predatory tendencies of Saddam Hussein 
facilitated a consensus on this issue.  Hans Blix stated that for the long-term interests of 
non-proliferation in the Middle East, a treaty designating the Middle East as a “WMD 
Free Zone” is desirable and that ridding Iraq of its WMD would be “a step towards such a 
goal.”33  In support of this overarching strategy, the immediate objective of resolution 
687 was to destroy Iraq’s chemical weapon stockpiles and bulk caches.  Various 
intelligence agencies had long suspected that Iraq had a biological weapons program 
although unlike its chemical weapons, intelligence could not determine the extent of the 
program.  The scarcity of intelligence on this issue would prove fateful, as it was a key 
issue taunted by the U.S. Secretary of State as casus belli.  
The Security Council had charged UNSCOM with the task of dismantling Iraq’s 
biological program and overseeing the destruction of any biological weapons, agents, or 
stockpiles.  To restrict delivery means, Iraq’s missiles were restricted to a range not to 
exceed 150 kilometers.  The Security Council also tasked UNSCOM to support the 
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in its effort to disarm Iraq’s nuclear 
program, assess the extent of its progress, and the recovery and removal of all fissile 
material.34  Since no precedent existed for such action, the United Nation’s only option 
                                                 
32   United Nations Security Resolution 687, April 3, 1991.  
http://www.stte.gov/p/nea/rls/01fs/14906.htm  (accessed December 15, 2005). 
33  Hans Blix, “The Role of Inspection as a Part of the Effort To Prevent The Possession of Weapons 
of Mass Destructions,”  Lecture at the 4th training course for future staff of UNMOVIC, Ottawa, Canada, 
May 28,2001,  http://www.un.org/Depts/unmovic/ExecChair/Blix%20in%20Ottawa.htm  (accessed 
December 15, 2005).   
34  Ibid.  
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for implementing the program was to employ an ad hoc inspection regime that was quasi 
modeled after the U.S.–USSR (Russia) bilateral inspection structure.35 
To achieve its disarmament objectives, UNSCOM implemented a three-phased 
plan.  The first objective was to locate and identify Iraq’s WMD stocks and missile 
assets.  UNSCOM relied on a combination of Iraq’s forthrightness in disclosing this 
information and input from national intelligence sources.  This leaves the true status of 
Iraq’s WMD assets somewhere between these two positions.  UNSCOM’s second task 
was to oversee and verify the destruction or disablement of these weapons.  The 
international community was well aware of Iraq’s use of chemical weapons in the Iran–
Iraq war.  Additionally, coalition forces had inadvertently destroyed stockpiles of 
chemical weapons in the Iraqi storage depot at Khamisiyah; therefore, the task of 
chemical weapons disarmament was much clearer than the biological issue.36  The final 
objective was to implement a plan for “ongoing monitoring and verification of Iraq’s 
compliance” with the disarmament resolution.37  Presumably, this would have been a 
combination of electronic surveillance, short or no notice inspections, and continuous 
monitoring.  Nonetheless, this phase of the operation to compel compliance would end 
before coming to fruition.    
UNSCOM’s first Executive Chairman, Rolf Ekeus, headed a 19-member College 
of Commissioners charged with advising and developing policy for this nascent effort.  
This leadership contingent operated from the UN headquarters in New York as well as 
field offices in Bahrain and Baghdad.38  Ekéus controlled a permanent team of 21 
international arms control experts, 50 headquarters staff members and another 50 support 
staff at the field offices. 
                                                 
35  The bilateral nonproliferation agreements between the United States and the Soviet Union were 
amongst the first treaties to require verification of equipment destruction and the implementation of 
monitoring operations.  
36  CIA Report on Gulf War Illness, “Khamisiyah: A Historical Perspective on Related Intelligence” 
April 9, 1997,  http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/gulfwar/whiteper/  (accessed  December 2,  2005).   
37  United Nations Security Resolution 687, April 3, 1991.  
http://www.stte.gov/p/nea/rls/01fs/14906.htm  (accessed  December 15, 2005). 
38  Trevor Findlay, “The Lessons of UNSCOM and UNMOVIC,” 70-76. 
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UNSCOM’s inspection team members took a “coalition of the willing approach” 
with most of the participants coming from Western states.39 From 1991 to 1998, 
contributing governments augmented UNSCOM’s inspection efforts with over 250 
visiting inspection teams.40  This approach is indicative of the ad hoc strategy taken by 
the Security Council to address the inspections needs.  Additionally, the Security Council 
may have been reacting to the need to hastily move on “current intelligence” before the 
Iraqis could start manipulating their suspected stockpiles.  Nonetheless, this “pay to play” 
tactic would have negative consequences for UNSCOM. 
Most of UNSCOM participants were from Western countries willing to contribute 
to the funding structure of UNSCOM.  The conspicuous lack of non-Western 
participation was in part because of this “pay to play” funding structure. 41  With only a 
$30 million annual budget, UNSCOM’s funding depended upon member governments to 
provide “gratis personnel, equipment, and service.”   In addition, contributing nations 
were responsible for training its own personnel because there was no institutionally 
standardized training available.  Most training in preparation for UNSCOM operations 
focused on the technical aspects of weapons elimination and did not involve cultural 
awareness training to facilitate and foster good working relationships with Iraq.   
The strategy, objectives, and structure of UNSCOM were an effort to meet the 
requirements of UNSC Resolution 687.  From the outset, the nascent inspection regime 
faced an uncertain probability of success.  Iraq helped solidify these doubts by 
challenging inspectors and consistently finding that the UN regime was mostly an 
innocuous endeavor backed by minimum resolve within the Security Council.  Almost 
from the start, Iraq employed a strategy of deception and denial, effectively thwarting 
UNSCOM’s efforts to assess its WMD assets.42  Though there were numerous incidents 
                                                 
39  Trevor Findlay, “The Lessons of UNSCOM and UNMOVIC,” 70-76.   
40  Stephan Black, “The UNSCOM Record,” Iraq, A New Approach, ed. Jessica T. Matthews. 
Washington D.C. (Sep 2002), The Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 
http://www.ceip.org/files/publications/iraq/black.htm  (accessed December 2, 2005). 
41  Remarks by Hans Blix, 2004 Carnegie International Non-Proliferation Conference, 2004, 
http://www.ceip.org/files/projects/npp/resources/2004conference/speeches/blix.htm  
42  Trevor Findlay, “The Lessons of UNSCOM and UNMOVIC,” 66. 
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causing contention, the final impasse between Iraq and UNSCOM came on October 29, 
1997.  Iraq’s Deputy Prime Minister Tariq Aziz informed the Security Council that Iraq 
would no longer permit U.S. personnel to participate in the UNSCOM inspections.  Aziz 
further demanded that UNSCOM no longer allow flights of the U-2 spy plane under the 
auspices of Resolution 687.43  
After many rebukes from the UN and several admonishing air strikes from the 
United States and Great Britain, Iraq ended UNSCOM inspections in October 1998.  The 
UN’s first attempt at compelled compliance had failed to verify fulfillment with its 
mandate.  On December 16, 1998, the Security Council withdrew all of UNSCOM’s staff 
from Iraq.  Its disarmament accomplishments included the discovery and disarmament of 
40 nuclear research facilities, the destruction of 480,000 liters of chemical agents, and 1.8 
million liters of precursors44.  While progress on biological disarmament was poor, 
UNSCOM did manage to expose a vast array of information regarding Iraq’s missile 
production capability.  
The Security Council appointed a special panel headed by Ambassador Ceslo 
Amorin of Brazil to analyze Iraq’s disarmament status.  Focusing on the unresolved 
issues, the Amorin panel synthesized UNSCOM’s disarmament activities and produced a 
prioritized list of unresolved issues.  Subsequent to the Amorin Panel report, the Security 
Council adopted Resolution 1284 sponsored by Russia, France, China and Canada 
establishing the United Nations Monitoring, Verification, and Inspection Commission 
(UNMOVIC) as the new inspection regime responsible for ensuring Iraqi disarmament.  
Although it would operate under the same mandate as UNSCOM, UNMOVIC’s inherent 




                                                 
43  United Nations Special Commission: Chronology of Main Events, December 1999  
http//www.un.org/Depts/unscom/Chronology/chronology.htm.  
44  Trevor Findlay, “The Lessons of UNSCOM and UNMOVIC,” 70-75.   
45  Ibid.  
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C. TRANSITIONING TO UNMOVIC 
 UNMOVIC’s modus opernadi reflected the UN Security Council’s polarity 
regarding Iraqi disarmament.  This polarity developed from the concerns of the United 
States and Great Britain about Iraq’s continued possession of WMD and the indifference 
of Russia, China, and France to Iraq’s rebuff of the UNSC mandate.  Also contributing to 
the polarity is the fact that the two sides also interpreted intelligence differently.46  
Additionally, there was a growing perception that UNSCOM Chairman Richard Butler’s 
close relations with the United States prevented him from operating objectively.47  The 
Security Council selected Hans Blix, who had led the nuclear inspections in Iraq, as 
UNMOVIC’s chairperson.  Blix’s experience as head of the IAEA inspection team under 
UNMOVIC made him aware of the challenges UNMOVIC faced.  Though duly 
qualified, his nomination was not without its critics.  Some commentators felt that Blix 
was too quick to give Iraq’s nuclear program a “clean bill of health” during UNSCOM 
inspections.48  These critics perhaps thought Blix would be too lenient on the Iraqi 
government allowing it to retain too much of its WMD stocks.   
Many commentators saw the new inspection regime as a “step back” from the 
intrusive and confrontational approach of UNSCOM.  One of the criticisms concerned 
the composition of UNMOVIC personnel.  49  Westerners made up the bulk of 
UNSCOM’s staff.  This was due in part to the funding structure of UNSCOM as nations 
pledged inspectors.  Conversely, the United Nations used an Iraqi oil escrow arrangement 
to fund UNMOVIC.50  This placed the budget outside the normal UN budgetary cycle, 
which prevented non-supporting states from intervening with the process.51  All of 
UNMOVIC's staff and inspectors were employees of the United Nations—divesting them 
                                                 
46  Trevor Findlay, “The Lessons of UNSCOM and UNMOVIC,” 70–76. 
47  Ibid.   
48  James A. Phillips, “Disarming Iraq:  The Lessons of UNSCOM,” The Heritage Foundation, 
October 28, 2002  http://www.heritage.org/Research/MiddleEast/bg1608.cfm.  (accessed December 2, 
2005).   
49  Ibid.   
50  Patricia Lewis, “From UNSCOM to UNMOVIC: The United Nations and Iraq”   
http://www.unidir.org/pdf/articles/pdf-art77.pdf  (accessed June 20, 2005).  
51  Trevor Findlay, “The Lessons of UNSCOM and UNMOVIC,” 79. 
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of national loyalty.  This was an apparent attempt to assuage Iraq’s claims of undue 
influence of the United States and Great Britain.  Blix invited UNSCOM inspectors to  
apply for positions on UNMOVIC’s staff and asked governments to nominate personnel 
for UNMOVIC duty.52  This allowed Blix to retain some members of the cadre of 
inspectors that worked for UNSCOM.  
UNMOVIC instituted a formal multi-disciplinary training program.53  This 
avoided canalization of information within the various inspection arenas.  Blix also 
included cultural sensitivity training as part of UNMOVIC’s training and changed the 
flow of intelligence information under the UNMOVIC regime.  Concerned with 
intelligence operatives on the inspection teams, Blix sought to make intelligence flow 
only one-way.54  Nations could provide intelligence to UNMOVIC, but the inspection 
agency was not to serve as a collection asset for national intelligence agencies.  To 
protect source information, UNMOVIC limited access to intelligence information to 
“special officers” entrusted by the provider nations and to team leaders responsible for 
exploiting the intelligence information.55  If given more time, the changes Blix 
implemented could have paid dividends in gaining the trust of the government of Iraq and 
subsequently easing the concerns of member-states.   
Although it may have appeared that UNMOVIC was a weaker inspection regime 
than UNSCOM, the new regime was actually more empowered because of its Chapter 
VII authorization gave it more teeth.  With the growing polarity on how to close the 
books on Iraq’s compliance with UN Resolution 687, as a proposed “final measure” 
UNMOVIC had greater political backing.  Security Council resolution 1441 served as the 
final concession to Iraq.  It stated that the Security Council would impose “serious 
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consequences” if Iraq did not fully comply.  In addition to reiterating previous demands, 
resolution 1441 permitted UNMOVIC to declare no-drive and no-fly zones around 
suspect sites, lifted restrictions on the inspection of presidential compounds, and 
established two regional offices that permitted quicker assess to inspection sites. 56  These 
facts effectively allowed UNMOVIC to operate under procedures that were more 
intrusive and comprehensive than those of UNSCOM.  It was also becoming obvious that 
the U.S. administration was growing intolerable to the deceptive antics of the Iraqi 
government and was advocating a more aggressive strategy for dealing with the 
disarmament issue.  Ideally, this should have provided the edge to coax Iraq into 
cooperating with the new regime.  
With almost five years elapsing between inspection periods, UNMOVIC also had 
technological advantages over UNSCOM.  Advances in radiation sensors provided more 
accurate readings than previously possible.  The IAEA employed advanced procedures to 
conduct environmental sampling with equipment capable of distinguishing between 
legitimate radioisotopes from those banned from nuclear weapon research or 
development.  Additionally, cross-disciplinary analysis and integration of databases 
between UNMOVIC and the IAEA enabled better analysis of Iraq’s patterns of 
behavior.57  Because it was frequently verifying previously destroyed stockpiles, 
UNMOVIC saw the first introduction of “forensic verification” or “verification 
archeology.”58  This process was especially useful considering the absence of monitoring 
operations during UNSCOM’s absence.  
UNMOVIC was seemingly a product of compromise between the U.S.–UK and 
the Russia–China–France blocs of the Security Council.  The makeup of UNMOVIC 
personnel addressed the Iraqi concerns that the inspections only served as a cover for 
Western spies.  The United States and United Kingdom were able to show resolve 
through resolution 1284, which kept Iraq “on the hook” for compliance with its 
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disarmament commitments.  UNMOVIC conducted its first inspection on November 27, 
2002—about the same time that the United States announced that it was taking unilateral 
actions against Iraq for failing to disarm its WMD.59  UNMOVIC identified numerous 
discrepancies relating to Iraq’s Chemical and Biological programs.  During its tenure, 
UNMOVIC personnel conducted 260 inspections while the IAEA conducted 139 
inspections.60  Nonetheless, its findings never equated with the intelligence reports 
presented by the United States and the United Kingdom; and even if it had, it is doubtful 
that it would have been enough.  
 
D THE INSURMOUNTABLE CHALLENGES 
The UN experience in Iraq was an exercise in cooperation.  Once inspectors 
disclosed Iraq’s deception and denial tactics, the verification process lost a great deal of 
validity.  The United States, however, did not always operate above board either—
reportedly planting listening devices in monitoring equipment and using the verification 
inspections for national intelligence-gathering purposes.61  Cooperation notwithstanding, 
the United Nations encountered five problems that influenced its operations in Iraq that 
neither regime was able to overcome.  These problems included: (1) gaining trust and 
confidence of the target state (Iraq) and key member-states (United State and Great 
Britain), (2) leveraging sanctions to achieve objectives, (3) exploitation of biological 
agents, and (4) devising a comprehensive and responsive intelligence model.62 
1. Gaining Trust  
Despite being more isolated from the influence of UN member-states than 
UNSCOM, there remained some WMD elimination challenges that UNMOVIC was still 
unable to overcome.  Most evident was its inability to gain full trust and cooperation from 
the government of Iraq.  With sanctions weakening and Iraq gaining international 
political support, full cooperation with UNMOVIC should have provided the motivation 
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and path towards ending sanctions.  Just like during UNSCOM’s tenure, Iraq continued 
to practice “denial and deception” tactics during UNMOVIC limited inspection and 
verification tenure.63  For reasons only he can answer, Saddam Hussein was apparently 
unconvinced that it was in his security interests to cooperate with the disarmament 
process.  From the very start of the inspection process, Iraq seemed to place a greater 
value on retaining some WMD capability, or achieving a level of ambiguity regarding its 
WMD capacity, than meeting dictated conditions for having sanctions lifted.  Gaining the 
trust of the target state is inherent to a cooperative endeavor.  The United Nations never 
addressed Iraq’s regional security concerns. 
Conversely, because of the initial episodes of non-cooperation, both regimes had 
problems convincing certain member-states that the inspections were going well.  
Retrospectively speaking, the public relations campaigns were failures.  Considering the 
insular nature of verification inspections, a better use of the media by both regimes would 
have enabled them to convey their success and better address the accusation of its 
critics.64  Additionally, a well-organized public relations campaign could have improved 
the U.S.–Iraq relationship and diluted Iraq’s intransigent attitudes towards the 
disarmament mandate.  
2. Leveraging Sanctions 
Although sanctions may have denied Iraq the resources needed to build its WMD 
programs, sanctions alone were not enough to force cooperation.  Leveraging sanctions to 
achieve counterproliferation objectives proved to be another insurmountable challenge.  
The use of sanctions as a means of preventing the proliferation of WMD has historically 
been a poor deterrent to change the behavior of a state that has determined that it is in its 
security interest to have a WMD capability.  Neither India nor Pakistan saw the 
imposition of sanctions as outweighing the impact of obtaining a nuclear capability on 
their security environment.65  
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 Likewise, the lifting of sanctions also proved an ineffective “carrot” to coax the 
government of Iraq to cooperate with UN counterproliferation mandates.  The Security 
Council was unable during either regime to use sanctions to shape Iraqi cooperation with 
the disarmament processes.  Many nations were moving towards supporting “smart 
sanctions” against Iraq.66  The public debate in favor of “smart sanctions” did little more 
than serve as evidence to the ineffectiveness of comprehensive sanctions and the 
divisiveness within the international community regarding the issue.67  There were many 
instances where states ignored UN imposed sanctions against Iraq, thereby further 
weakening its effects.  In addition, non-state actors were more than willing to turn a blind 
eye on UN sanctions in favor of lucrative business deal.  Even U.S. corporations were 
guilty of this transgression.  68   
Leveraging sanctions is primarily a political issue and outside the immediate 
control of inspectors; however, future UN counterproliferation endeavors must 
implement a more cogent “carrot and stick” strategy to be effective.  For instance, if the 
United States had allowed UNMOVIC inspections to continue against a backdrop of a 
convincing ground force buildup, it may have provided the teeth to make the process 
more effective.  Although sanctions had no role in crippling Iraq’s WMD reconstitution 
efforts between UNSCOM and UNMOVIC, it could have been much more effective if 
backed by a credible military threat.69 
3. Exploitation of Biological Agents 
Another challenge that proved insuperable to the United Nations through both 
UNSCOM and UNMOVIC regimes was the inability to verify the reduction of Iraq’s 
biological agents.  The duel-use aspects of biological agents contribute to this fact, as did 
Iraq’s deceptive practices and faulty intelligence input from the United States and Great 
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Britain.  Before UNSCOM ended its inspection, it considered Iraq’s biological inspection 
file to be the most incomplete of the three categories of WMD—nuclear, biological, and 
chemical.70  UNSCOM identified the production of 19,000 liters of botulinum, 8,400 
liters of anthrax, and 2,000 liters of aflatoxin and successfully destroyed a laboratory and 
production facility at Al Hakam.71  Any non-cooperation regarding biological agents, no 
matter how legitimate, will raise red flags.  Furthermore, it is not always practical to 
destroy the production means because of concerns that such equipment may be necessary 
for medicinal use.  Total destruction of the target state’s infrastructure to produce 
legitimate biological agents could latently contribute to a humanitarian crisis in the event 
some type of pandemic.  
U.S. intelligence reports suggested that Iraq had outfitted several vehicles that 
served as mobile laboratories, dispersed throughout the country producing biological 
agents, while Iraq claimed that these vehicles were strictly for husbandry purposes.72  
The Iraqi Survey Group (ISG) reported that the U.S. intelligence reports were unfounded 
and subsequently repudiated the claims in its final report.  73  Biological agent inspection 
and verification will remain a challenge across the spectrum of WMD 
nonproliferation/counterproliferation because of its duel-use characteristic, small 
infrastructure requirement, and ease of concealment.   
Neither regime implemented a WMD destruction plan that showed detailed 
consideration for public safety and health concerns.  It is widely suspected that open pit 
demolition used by the Iraqis under observation of UNSCOM inspectors to destroy 
stockpiles of chemical munitions may have exposed some team members to toxic 
chemicals.74  Although UNMOVIC may have improved the protection practices making  
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it safer for its inspectors, concern for public healthcare was still not a priority of the 
regime.  A more comprehensive environmental awareness effort must be included in the 
destruction plans of future WMD eliminations endeavors.  
4. Intelligence Models  
The final challenge this section addresses is lack of access to and integration of 
accurate intelligence.  Blix’s implementation of the Amorin panel recommendation to 
restructure intelligence handling may have created a “one-way” street for intelligence, but 
it did little to counter the promulgation of erroneous information by the United States and 
Great Britain.  Over thirty nations provided intelligence input during the UNSCOM 
regime.75  Several nations provided information to the UN that was collected by highly  
sophisticated national technical means and human intelligence (HUMINT).  Rolf Ekeus 
would later remark that these contributions proved only marginally beneficial at best in 
assessing Iraq’s WMD programs.76   
Contributing to the lack of an effective intelligence model was not only Iraq’s 
“denial and deception” program effort, but also the fact that some of the tainted 
HUMINT information came from self-interested sources.  These sources effectively 
manipulated the “intelligence void” to portray a picture that benefited their political and 
personal agendas.  Further complicating the intelligence model were national interests in 
protecting the means and sources of intelligence.  This may have tainted the sense of 
urgency necessary to exploit some intelligence and caused some inspectors to question 
the provenance of the information.77  Nonetheless, the biggest disconnect seems to have 
been the skewing and shaping of intelligence to fit national perceptions.  
In December 2005, President Bush admitted that most of the intelligence used to 
justify the invasion of Iraq was wrong.78  For both regimes, working towards 
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disarmament in this type of intelligence model proved to be a losing proposition that 
adversely effecting the domestic political relations of all nations involved.  The United 
Nations must adequately address these problems if future cooperative disarmament 
efforts are to be successful and unilateral action made unnecessary.   
 
E. WHY THE UNITED STATES CANNOT RELY ON THE UN TO 
CONDUCT WEAPONS ELIMINATION 
In the wake of U.S. failure to confirm its claims of WMD in Iraq, the UN’s 
counterproliferation regimes have gained some questionable credibility.  One of the 
advantages to UN-led operations is its inherent legitimacy.  When the collective body of 
the UN speaks in unison, it presents a very powerful and persuasive case.  It also has a 
large pool of experts available for participation, which was evident over the ten-plus year 
the UN operated in Iraq.  Based on its elimination record, UNSOCOM was responsible 
for the destruction of more WMD stockpiles and related infrastructure than the 
counterforce strikes conducted by coalition forces during Operation Desert 
Storm/Shield.79  This underscores the potential capability of UN-led efforts.  
Furthermore, future UN regimes would ultimately build on the collective knowledge of 
UNSCOM, UNMOVIC, as well as the experience gained from the unilateral exploitation 
during Operation Iraq Freedom.80   
Within the past few years, the international community has become more 
aggressive in its counterproliferation effort.  In 2004, the United Nations instituted 
innovative and aggressive policies such as UN Security Council Resolution 1540 to 
combat proliferation.  According to the resolution, states are required to enact laws that 
prevent access to WMD.81  Another measure that points towards a growing consensus 
regarding the international commitment to non-proliferation is the overwhelming 
agreement amongst member-states to such agreements as the Proliferation Security 
Initiative (PSI).  Over 60 countries are signatories to this effort to improve the 
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international nonproliferation and counterterrorism endeavor.82  This is a clear indication 
that the international community is inclined to trust a collective approach to 
counterproliferation.    
Further solidifying this accord is the fact that the United States seems enthralled 
in a perpetual quagmire of civil strife in Iraq after rebuffing numerous requests to allow 
UNMOVIC more time to continue its work.  Nonetheless, despite the potential of UN-led 
cooperative based weapons elimination, DoD must be prepared to conduct coercive 
weapons elimination if required.  Two reasons why DoD should institutionalize WMD 
elimination are the difficulty in reaching a consensus on how much disarmament is 
required and the unwillingness of member-state to elevate from diplomatic 
nonproliferation operations to methods that are more coercive.  
1. Difficulty in Reaching Decisions 
One key question that remains unexplored is the amount of residue that a target 
state can retain and still claim that it has disarmed.  Why were the levels of degradation 
accomplished by UNSCOM and UNMOVIC not satisfactory to United States and Great 
Britain?  Retrospectively, it is clear that the UN had achieved an acceptable level of 
degradation, but the UN failed to confirm this.  Theoretically, the gap between the 
weapons that UNSCOM and UNMOVIC documented as destroyed and those that 
intelligence sources indicated still existed posed a credible threat to the regional security 
of this strategically important area.  Considering the heightened state of concern over the 
technology-radicalism nexus, it is doubtful that anything short of total disarmament will 
assuage the concerns of governments reacting to domestic fear of terrorist attacks.  This 
greatly detracts from the potential of the model of cooperative weapons elimination 
employed in Iraq.  
2. Elevating from Nonproliferation to Counterproliferation  
Another reason that the United States should integrate and institutionalize WMD 
elimination is that the UN Security Council may be unwilling to elevate from diplomatic 
nonproliferation approaches to more forceful counterproliferation methods—as was the 
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case with Iraq in 2002 (see Figure 3).  From the end of the Gulf War in 1991 through 
OIF, the UN and the United States employed both nonproliferation and 
counterproliferation tactics (counterforce air strikes) against Iraq’s weapons program, but 
nothing forced Iraq to acquiesce to the UN’s demands.  It is now obvious that Iraq 
wanted to maintain a degree of plausible doubt about the status of its WMD capability 
because of regional security concerns.  The threat of Iraq possibly transferring WMD to 
terrorist, however, was sufficient for the United States to make an argument that the 
intractable regime was a threat to its security.  The efforts to deny WMD to Hussein’s 
regime are indicative of the new arms control paradigm and underscore the new focus on 
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Figure 3: Military Mission Areas (After Ref. 8).  The UN was not able to 
reach a consensus on escalating from nonproliferation operations (lower half of chart) to 
more aggressive counterproliferation operations (upper half of chart).  
 
The United Nations verification was initially a nonproliferation cooperative 
endeavor, however, because of Iraq’s unaccommodating stance, it eroded into a situation 
that required counterproliferation options to ensure compliance.  The UNSC was 
unwilling to escalate towards counterproliferation options to force Iraq’s compliance with 
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UN disarmament mandates.  This may prove to be the case in future situations; therefore, 
the U.S. military must possess the capability to conduct WMD elimination missions in 
support of the national strategy to combat WMD.  
 
F. CONCLUSION: THE LIMITS OF COOPERATIVE DISARMAMENT 
While cooperative, nonproliferation approaches to disarmament are preferred, 
DoD must posses a standing capability to disarm adversaries.  First, Iraq’s initial denial 
and deception tactics tainted this cooperative approach to disarmament.  Neither of the 
UN-led regimes was able to recover from this transgression enough to regain the trust of 
all the member-states.  Secondly, it is difficult to reach a consensus about what level of 
disarmament is satisfactory.  Security Council member-states seemingly had varying 
views about the threat Iraq posed.  Nonetheless, against the backdrop of the September 
11, 2001 terrorist attacks, in the U.S. perspective, only verifiably complete and total 
disarmament would suffice.  The target state must acquiesce and provide unconditional 
cooperation or confidence is lost in the enterprise.  Thirdly, the UN Security Council may 
not be willing to escalate pass diplomatic nonproliferation methods.  Although UN-led 
counterproliferation operations hold a lot of promise, multilateral efforts short of invasion 
may not be able to overcome the perceived threat from the radicalism–technology nexus.  
The United Nations initially employed an ad hoc approach in building its inspection 
program.  The initial regime, UNSCOM, was composed primarily of Westerners and 
depended on Western states for equipment and augmentees.83  After Iraq ceased 
cooperation with UNSCOM in 1997, the Security Council passed Resolution 1284, which 
incorporated many recommendations from the Amorin Panel and led to the creation of 
UNMOVIC.   
There were many challenges to the UN-led verification process that proved 
insurmountable.  Amongst them were gaining the trust of the target state as well as the 
member-states that perceived a security threat, leveraging sanctions to achieve 
counterproliferation objectives, the exploitation of biological agents, and intelligence 
integration.  The inability of the United Nations to overcome these challenges contributed 
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to Iraq’s insecurities and the U.S. apprehension of the regimes ability to disarm the 
nation.  One key question regarding the UN WMD elimination regimes is the amount of 
residual WMD that is acceptable.  Domestic anxiety associated with the radicalism–
technology nexus may require that the amount of residual WMD be far less than efforts 
short of a full-scale invasion can accomplish, thereby detracting from the prospective role 
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III. A CAPABILITY GAP EXPOSED:  U.S. 
COUNTERPROLIFERATION IN IRAQ, 2003–2004 
A. INTRODUCTION  
In 2002, the Bush administration started to promulgate its case for invading Iraq 
and ending a decade plus of Saddam Hussein’s WMD brinksmanship.  On October 7, 
2003, President Bush stated that UN inspections in Iraq had failed because of Iraq’s 
successful deception program.  He declared that Iraq’s days of denying, deceiving, and 
delaying the destruction of its illegal weapons had ended.  Bush suggested that the 
possibility of Iraq transferring WMD to terrorist organizations such as Al Qaeda was a 
reason for the U.S. to act with urgency.84  Bush’s position was very clear—his 
administration had the resolve to disarm Iraq. 
The United States had not conducted any type of counterproliferation mission 
since the Second World War.  Contemporary military planners considered WMD 
eliminations as a counterforce mission conducted in support of the warfight, but not as its 
primary objective.  DoD had no plans for the comprehensive dismantlement of an 
adversaries’ WMD program.  At the time of Bush’s October 2003 speech, however, 
several organizations were preparing for the elimination challenge.  They formed the first 
large-scale WMD exploitation force in the history of the United States.  There mission 
was to locate, identify, and eventually destroy Iraq’s illegal weapons and missile 
systems—compelling Iraq to comply with UN Security Council Resolution 687.  
In support of this thesis position, this chapter analyzes the challenges faced during 
OIF WMD elimination mission.  Although the United States can dominate across the 
spectrum of conventional warfare, being improperly prepared to conduct a 
comprehensive WMD elimination campaign could jeopardize the safety of U.S. forces 
and undermine U.S. national security interests.  Furthermore, considering that neither the 
75th XTF nor the unprecedented effort of the ISG found any WMD, it is easy to shift 
blame to poor prewar intelligence.  This gives undeserved credit to an ad hoc process that 
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may or may not have been able to discover Iraq’s WMD cache.  Although the 75th XTF 
performed admirably under adverse conditions, there were numerous problems 
attributable to the novelty of the mission that a “pickup-game” approach only 
amplified.85  This chapter starts with an overview of DoD’s development of a weapons 
elimination concept for Iraq.  It examines the conceptual development and 
implementation of the three-phased elimination plan devised by DOD.  Secondly, it 
draws on existing literary works as well as the personal experience and observations of 
the author who participated in the weapons elimination in Iraq.  The chapter then looks at 
the mid-course adjustment made when DoD transferred responsibility for the elimination 
mission to the Iraqi Survey Group.   
 
B. VISIONS OF EXPLOITATION:  THE 75TH XTF (JULY 2002–MARCH 
2003) 
As the Bush administration solidified its case for invasion, DoD was making the 
initial plans for the total dismantlement of Iraq’s WMD programs.  Since it had, no 
standing capability to conduct WMD elimination, the mission would require an ad hoc 
organization to integrate the necessary capabilities to perform the mission.  The following 
sections discuss the formation of the elimination concept and secondly, how DoD 
implemented the concept.   
1. The Power Point Phase: Developing the Prototype of WMD 
Elimination  
To operationalize President Bush’s intent to disarm Iraq, DoD formed a working 
group of 20–25 planners with the objective to formulate the WMD elimination plans.86  
Personnel from the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), CENTCOM, National Defense University 
(NDU), Office of Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance (ORHA), Defense 
Intelligence Agency (DIA), and the Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA) made up 
the diverse working group.   
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Rather than fight the war and then search for WMD, DoD planned to conduct the 
exploitation phase of the elimination mission during combat operations.  Waiting until 
the end of hostilities to start the search for WMD would have allowed maneuver 
commanders to concentrate their focus on the warfight, provided additional time to create 
the right mix of experts, and provided a more permissive environment for civilian 
participation.  Conversely, it would have increased Iraq’s opportunity to conceal the 
weapons or potentially use them against Coalition forces.  Conducting the search 
simultaneously with combat operations would facilitate gathering evidence against the 
regime, prevent the transfer of WMD to other states such as Syria, and otherwise obstruct 
the Iraqi option for using the weapons.87  DoD produced a WMD elimination plan 
consisting of three phases—exploitation, destruction, and monitoring.88  In phase I, the 
exploitation task force would search specified targets from a prioritized list identified by 
the U.S. intelligence community and referred to as the Iraq Master Site List (IMSL).89  
CFLCC’s C5 Future Operations branch created the Sensitive Site Exploitation Cell, 
which was responsible for integrating the IMSL targets (15–20 sites) with the combat 
mission.  The objective was to locate and identify any WMD related material at these 
locations.  Site Survey Teams (SSTs) were responsible for this task.    
If the survey team located any suspect material, equipment, or discovered 
suspicious activities, the 75th XTF would dispatch second team of specialist to the site to 
conduct a more detailed investigation.  This team—referred to as a mobile exploitation 
team (MET)—would be responsible for verifying the SST’s findings, conducting more 
extensive investigations, and evacuating samples of the materials.  METs would also 
have the capability to retrieve computer files, examine documents, and interrogations.90  
The METs could also conduct exploitation mission based on field intelligence or 
                                                 
87  Colonel Raymond T. Van Pelt, “JTF-WMD Elimination, An Operational Architecture For 
Contingencies,” http://www.ndu.edu/library/ic6/2004IS1.pdf (accessed June 25, 2006), 9.  
88  Rebecca K.C. Hersman , “Eliminating Adversary Weapons of Mass Destruction:  What’s at 
Stake?”   
89  LTC Randolph, email message to author, March 9, 2006.   
90  Ibid.   
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interviews with persons of interests.91  Once the MET confirmed the presence of WMD 
and extracted samples, the site would supposedly be secured until the end of major 
combat operation when phase II of the elimination process would start.  Phase II required 
an element capable of safely and verifiable destroying, dismantling, or otherwise 
disabling the identified material, production facility, or weapon systems. 92 Although the 
MET had a limited capability to conduct some of the tasks required of phase II, a follow-
on element would conduct the bulk of the phase II mission.   
Phase III (monitoring), requires continuous observation or periodic inspections of 
the site to ensure WMD materials and/or production capabilities are not reconstituted, 
transferred, or otherwise misused.93  For example, consider a dual-purpose biological 
facility used to produce human vaccines.  It would be in interest of public health to allow 
legitimate research and production to continue while monitoring to ensure that no agents 
associated with biological weapons were being developed.  DOD did not designate 
responsibility for phase III; presumably, the Department of State would have assumed 
responsibility as part of the stabilization and reconstruction efforts.   
With an elimination plan on the table, it was the responsibility of Coalition Forces 
Land Component Commander (CFLCC) to integrate the elimination mission into the 
CENTCOM’s operational plans. 
2. From Power Point to Reality 
There may have been doubts regarding the elimination plan, but DOD’s working 
group had probably devised the best available solution to the WMD elimination task 
given that DoD had no standing capacity to conduct such a mission.  Considering the 
compressed timeline produced by the political milieu , other options—such as allowing 
UNMOVIC participation or building a large multilateral elimination force—were not 
politically feasible given  that the UN Security Council did not support the war. 
                                                 
91  The SAT could also be used for unplanned or “non-IMSL” targets.  This increasingly occurred as 
the primary list was exhausted.  
92  Rabecca K.C., “Eliminating Adversary Weapons of Mass Destruction:  What’s at Stake?,”   
93  Ibid.  
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Staffing the task force would also be a challenge.  DoD’s forces are well suited 
for counterforce operations, but the weapons elimination mission fell outside the scope of 
U.S. forces.  Because its everyday mission aligned so closely with WMD elimination, 
more so than any other activity in DoD, DTRA was one of the first elements tagged by 
DOD to participate in the elimination mission.  DTRA routinely conducted permissive 
elimination-related inspection in support of such State Department’s nonproliferation 
treaties as Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START), Chemical Warfare Convention 
(CWC), and the Plutonium Production Reactor Agreement (PPRA) with Russia.  DTRA 
primarily used military personnel to conduct these inspections.  Being well suited for the 
elimination mission, DOD tasked DTRA to provide CENTCOM with site assessment 
teams (SATs) to conduct the site surveys in support of phase I operations.94 
DoD tasked the 75th Field Artillery Brigade to serve as the headquarters for the 
elimination mission and to provide command and control, logistical support, and 
transportation for the SAT and MET teams.  Other key units designated to participate 
included the 87th Chemical Company from Fort Polk, Louisiana and the 787th Ordinance 
Company (EOD) from Moffett Field, California.  The plan required the 75th XTF to 
provide CENTCOM with four survey teams that would maneuver with the combat force.  
These teams were composed of DTRA’s SAT teams, a support element from the 75th 
Field Artillery Brigade Headquarter Company, an explosive ordinance disposal (EOD) 
team, and a chemical reconnaissance platoon—a total of 23 personnel .  
The MET was composed of a Chemical Biological Intelligence Support teams 
(CBIS) from DIA, U.S. Army Technical Escorts Units (TEU), Explosive Ordinance 
Disposal Units, Criminal Investigation Division (CID), and Media Exploitation teams.95  
A typical MET team would have from 25–30 personnel assigned.  Another DTRA 
                                                 
94  Although referred to as Site Assessment Teams (SAT), once support elements were attached the 
entity was referred to as a Site Survey Team (SST).  Within the scope of this thesis, SAT will refer 
specifically to the 6-man teams designated to conduct the survey.  
95  Gregory Fontenot , On Point, The United States Army in Operation Iraqi Freedom , (Leavenworth, 
Kansas:  U.S. Army Center for Lessons Learned, 2004), also available online at 
http://call.army.mil/products/on-point/toc.asp  (accessed  March  17, 2006). 
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element assigned to the 75th XTF was Task Force Disablement/Elimination (TF D/E).96  
TF D/E would conduct the bulk of the task associated with phase II of the operation.  It 
would safely and verifiably destroy, dismantle, or otherwise disable the identified 
material, production facility, or weapons system.  TF D/E also had members from the 
U.S. Army Nuclear and Chemical Agency (USANCA), a U.S. Army Technical Escort 
unit, and representatives from the Missile and Space Intelligence Center (MSIC).  With 
limited exception, the 75th XTF, under the astute leadership of Colonel Richard McPhee, 
was responsible for all of CENTCOM’s military units and civilian personnel designated 
to participate in the weapons elimination mission (see Annex A.).  By 8 March 2003, the 
vision of a task force designed to conduct WMD elimination had come to fruition.  The 
units assigned to the 75th XTF consolidated in the desert of northern Kuwait and started 
training for its mission.   
The training mission ended with a “certification exercise” conducted to validate 
the tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) that the teams were employing.  The 
certification process provided the commander of the 75th XTF a degree of confidence that 
the teams were as prepared as possible to conduct this quaint mission (figure 3).  It also 
served to increase the confidence of some of the team members that were unfamiliar with 
the mission.  On March 8, SST-1 and SST-3 were certified and deemed ready for the 
elimination task.  CFLCC attached them to the lead divisions of the invasion force—the 
Third Infantry Division and the First Marine Expeditionary Force respectively.  CFLCC 
assigned the other two SAT teams to V Corps.  The British were responsible for 
conducting the search for WMD in their area of responsibility in southern Iraq.  If 
deemed necessary, the 75th XTF’s MET teams would further exploit suspected sites.     
 
                                                 
96  Task Force Disablement/Elimination was a late addition to the WMD elimination plan.  DTRA 
deployed it in late March in response to DOD concerns that the 75th XTF was not robust enough to destroy 
the amount of WMD that SST's would find.  TF D/E also facilitated the transition between the 75th XTF 
and ISG.  They continued to provide support to the ISG during its unsuccessful hunt for Iraqi WMD.    
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Figure 4: SST/MET Certification Training.  SST-1 going through certification 
training in March 2003 in Northern Kuwait.  The training was the first time the entire 
SST had worked together.  (Photo taken by MSG Ray Drinkard, SST-1) 
 
C. THE SEARCH FOR THE SMOKING GUN (MARCH 20–JUNE 15, 2003)  
On March 20, 2003, the lead elements of the U.S. Army’s Third Infantry Division 
led the invasion of Iraq.  For many soldiers, it was their first combat experience, while 
others were experienced combat veterans.  All of them had trained hard; they were highly 
motivated and ready for the fight.  On the morning of the invasion, however, there was an 
addition to their standard convoy lineup—SST 1.  Some of the maneuver commanders 
had rehearsed this scenario many times at the National Training Center (NTC).  These 
rehearsals, however, never included elimination operations.        
SST-1 was the first survey team from the 75th XTF to conduct an exploitation 
mission.  From the outset, there were concerns regarding this untested operation with 
commanders expressing concerns that it detracted from the warfight.  The 75th XTF 
investigated over 300 sites across Iraq before being relieved by the ISG.97  Its failure to 
discover any significant evidence of Iraq’s weapons cache caused some skepticism of the 
novel concept of WMD elimination.  This led in part to its replacement in June 2003 by  
                                                 
97  Stephen A. Combone, “Briefing on Iraq Survey Group,” DefenseLink, May 30, 2003. 
http://www.defenselink.mil/transcripts/2003/tr20030530-0231.html  (accessed June 26, 2006). 
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the ISG.  The 75th XTF’s WMD elimination mission in Iraq revealed some important 
lessons about capability gaps existing between DoD’s concept of the elimination 
operation and its actual execution.   
1. Integrating the Elimination Task with the Warfight 
For the soldiers of the Third Infantry Division, their mission was clear—get to 
Baghdad as quick as possible in order to sack the Baath party government headed by 
Saddam Hussein.  The sooner they got it done; the sooner they could go home.  The 
soldiers of SST 1 had a different focus—finding Iraq’s WMD.  The sooner they found 
them, the sooner they could go home.  Although these objectives were symbiotic, the 
elimination task was understandably a collateral mission for field commanders focusing 
on the warfight.  This would have a profound effect on the search for WMD.     
For example, on 22 March, as the 3rd Infantry was starting its westward trek 
towards An Najef, V Corp tasked SST-1 to conduct a survey of Tallil Airbase—a 
possible storage site for chemical munitions.  The airbase was void of enemy combatants 
and U.S. forces were securing the site.  The problem was that SST-1 was assigned to a 
brigade that was preparing to attack another objective, therefore it could not afford the 
time required to conduct a thorough search.  Although the site had numerous bunkers that 
could have stored chemical weapons or illegal missiles, SST-1 had less than one day to 
conduct the survey.  Since the intelligence did not provide any specific search criteria, the 
team could only make a cursory inspection of the site.  
If there were WMD located at the site, SST-1 could have missed them because of 
the hasty inspection.  Hindsight being 20/20, the fact that SST-1 did not thoroughly 
survey the site mattered little.  Adversaries that are more formidable may take advantage 
of such shortcomings.  To be conducted properly, this mission required a lot more 
resources—multiple teams (or larger teams) over a longer period.  Additionally, combat 
forces should have secured the site to prevent the possible recovery of munitions by Iraqi 
forces or looting by civilians.98  This exemplifies the dilemma for maneuver commanders  
 
                                                 
98  Third Infantry Division (Mechanized) After Action Report for Operation Iraqi Freedom,  
http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/report/2003/3id-aar-jul03.pdf  (accessed March 14, 2005). 
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early in the conflict.  During OIF, the drive towards Baghdad was a synchronized effort; 
therefore, commanders were reluctant to detract forces from the warfight in support of the 
elimination mission.   
2. Interpreter Support for the SST 
The fact that the survey teams had no organic linguist support hindered the 
elimination mission more than team leaders had anticipated.  For example, Iraqi labs 
generally used the standard international hazard symbols which team members were 
familiar with.  The teams also easily understood the chemical containers in labs that used 
international standards.  However, files, documents, and equipment were inscribed in  
Arabic, which stymied the exploitation process (see Figure 4).       
 
Figure 5: Arabic Inscriptions. Inert training missile found at the Rashid Missile 
Production Facility near Baghdad, Iraq on 19 April 2003.  The top caption is “Al Fath.”  
The bottom caption is Rashid.  The symbols in the middle are the Arabic letters F, T, and 
H for FataH, which means victory.  Photo taken by SFC Tharien Graham (SST-1). 
 
Although the MET team had interpreters assigned, the fact that the SSTs had no 
assigned interpreters increased the chances of missing critical information.  If a survey 
team overlooked critical information, it is doubtful that the MET would ever get an 
opportunity to exploit it.  The SSTs were functionally illiterate given that they organic 
interpreter support.  The lack of an interpreter could also unnecessarily prolong survey 
missions.  During an inspection at an underground bunker structure at Abu Ghraib, team 
members of SST-1 expended valuable time breaking down a door labeled “exit” in 
Arabic.  If the team had an interpreter, the insignificance of the door could have been 
determined by simply walking to the back of the bunker facility and verifying that it 





Figure 6: Looted labs at Baghdad University School of Veterinary Medicine.  Dr. 
Hussein stated that he had pleaded with the looters not to take the lab equipment.  He told 
them that such equipment as centrifuges would be of no use to them.  His pleas were to 




Once U.S. forces consolidated in Baghdad, interpreters become available to work 
with the survey teams.  Their contribution made the survey process safer and more 
efficient.  For example, on 17 April, SST-1 CFLCC tasked SST-1 to survey the 
veterinary labs at Baghdad University.  While the team was preparing to enter, an Iraqi 
professor that worked at the university informed the team through an interpreter that 
looters had stolen equipment and destroyed the lab.  In the process, they had 
compromised cultures of Brucellas, Salmonella, Staph, and Strep (see figure 6).  The 
school also used the lab to research hoof and mouth disease.  This information enabled 
the team take more precise precautionary measures to prevent the spread of these 
infectious diseases agents.  DoD must integrate this invaluable asset at every level of the 
WMD elimination process—particularly during the exploitation phase.  
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3. Reachback Capability 
Each SAT team was equipped with satellite communication systems.  This should 
have provided the team with secure reachback capabilities to the 75th XTF or, ideally, 
communications with subject matter experts anywhere in the world.  Nonetheless, the 
communication equipment was unsecured and unreliable.  The teams were never able to 
maintain secure connections; furthermore, even unsecured connectivity with the 75th XTF 
through the INMARSAT system was spotty at best.  Better equipment could have greatly 
increased the SAT team effectiveness by enabling them to provide subject matter experts 
with photos, video clips, or faxes of documents.     
In the future, it is imperative that the exploitation teams leverage communication 
technology to their advantage.  An effective reachback capability is critical during 
nonpermissive and semi-permissive elimination operations; it expands the knowledge 
base on the battlefield without placing additional personnel at risk.  In addition, it protects 
the teams from adversaries that are more sophisticated and may posses the capacity to 
intercept and exploit unsecured communications.   
4. Lack of Integrated Training 
During initial hostilities, CFLCC’s Sensitive Site Exploitation Cell (SSE) 
controlled the rate of SST inspections.  As the maneuver elements moved north, the SSE 
cell would notify commanders on the ground of the location of sensitive sites they needed 
to survey for possible further exploitation.  Brigade commanders were responsible for 
ensuring that the SSTs had the logistical and security support required to accomplish the 
survey mission.  The security protocols varied between the brigades that SST were 
attached.  CFLCC attached SST-1 and SST-3 to their respective maneuver elements in 
the beginning.  Of the 30 plus survey SST-1 completed, the team never conducted a 
mission without security escorts, including the relative calm period that followed the end 
of hostilities.  Conversely, other teams routinely conducted missions without escorts.99  
This is a clear indication of the lack of consistency that existed between elements with 
operational control of the SSTs.  Army maneuver units—like the Marines—hone their 
skills in the training environment.  To throw a new element into the equation without a 
                                                 
99  Joseph Clemons, interview with author, April 12, 2006.  
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“trial run” would understandably raise the concern of many commanders.  DoD must 
integrate elimination scenarios into operational and tactical level training exercises and 
allow future elimination task forces an opportunity to train with maneuver forces if 
possible.   
5.  Securing High Priority Sites 
In addition to the erroneous pre-war intelligence, pillaged sites also fettered the 
search for WMD.  No one anticipated the rapid breakdown of civil order in the form of 
looting that occurred in the wake of the Iraq war.  Looters had stripped everything of 
value at most of the military and government sites that SST-1 surveyed.  On several 
occasions, SST-1 arrived at sites while looting was taking place.  The team often had to 
clear sites of looters before survey operations could begin.  Looters would methodically 
strip a site of anything of value—right down to the doors and windows.  Looters even 
pillaged Iraq’s nuclear research facility taking virtually everything.  Local villagers were 
storing water and washing cloths in barrels once used to store yellowcake at the Tuwaitha 
Nuclear Research Center.100  The IAEA reported that the vast majority of uranium and 
thorium remained on the site; however, there were several reports of radiation sickness.  
CFLCC only managed to secure 153 of the 370 sites thought to be associated with Iraq’s 
WMD program.  101 
Had any of these sites actually had WMD located on it, the looters would have 
likely compromised sites hindering the survey effort.  Furthermore, if insurgents had 
obtained passion of the weapons the present day situation in Iraq may be a lot grimmer.  
Not only would it add an additional risk to coalition personnel, its use in the sectarian  
violence would have a devastating effect on the stabilization of the country.  Future 
WMD elimination operations must not discount the use of counterforce in favor of 
evidence collecting.   
 
 
                                                 
100  “TF D/E Nuclear Disablement Team helps Recover Looted Material,”  DTRA Connection, 
Aug/Sep 2003,  5, 8, 18. 
101   Ibid.  
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6. Free-for-All WMD Elimination 
Employing tactical units to search for WMD caused a pronounced drop in 
proficiency.  As the 75th XTF’s effort continued to produce nothing but dry holes in its 
search for WMD, the elimination plans started to morph.  As more units consolidated in 
Baghdad and with President Bush declaring an end of hostilities, more units started 
getting involved in the search for WMD.  In addition, there was growing pressure on the 
Bush administration to substantiate its claim that Iraq possessed WMD in violation of UN 
mandate.  As it became painfully obvious that the original IMSL sites were not producing 
the expected results, CFLCC started conducting searches from what it referred to as an ad 
hoc or non-IMSL sites.  It was also becoming clear that the 75th XTF did not have enough 
assets to conduct all the searches.  To remedy this, CFLCC started employing tactical 
troops under the direction of battalion chemical officers to search for WMD.102   
 Granted, the 75th XTF’s assets could have used more training before deployment; 
however, it was much better equipped and trained than the tactical units searching for 
WMD.  These tactical units were equipped and train to conduct conventional chemical 
reconnaissance.  The objective of conventional chemical reconnaissance is to locate 
WMD on the battlefield so that maneuver forces can avoid it or takes protective posture.  
It does not require assessments of site activity or WMD production or storage.  The SATs 
were trained in this aspect and had developed, and refined a systemic approach to site 
assessment rather than just looking for a product.  Had WMD actually existed in Iraq, this 
pronounced decline in proficiency may have delayed its discovery.  Safety is also a 
concern since tactical units do not have a capability to detect toxic industrial chemicals     
and material (TIC/TIMs), as did the SSTs.103       
7. Biological Expertise Integrated at Lowest Operating Level 
Because of the difficulty in detecting biological agents, each team should have 
biological experts assigned.  The SSTs were trained to use bioassay kits for this purpose, 
but few team members mastered this equipment.  Each of the MET teams had biological 
                                                 
102   Gregory Fontenot, On Point, The United States Army in Operation Iraqi Freedom. 
103  Third Infantry Division (Mechanized) After Action Report for Operation Iraqi Freedom, 
(undated), 246 http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/report/2003/3id-aar-jul03.pdf  (accessed  
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experts assigned, but if the SSTs failed to identify or suspect any biological activity, the 
expert may not have an opportunity to assess the site.  At Baghdad University’s 
Veterinary labs, SST-1 encountered numerous cultures that raised suspicion.  Because 
biological agent detection is so difficult and its effects so potentially devastating, future 
exploitation should ensure biological experts are assigned to each site survey team as 
well as the METs.  
 
Figure 7: Inoculated Egg at Baghdad University Veterinary Lab.  Considered a key 
indicator of biological weapons activity, researchers use egg to incubate virus cells before 
transferring them the larger containers.   
8. Lack of a Robust Operational-level Intelligence Cell 
The 75th XTF’s concept of operation focused on searching sites for WMD or 
WMD related material.  As such, its intelligence assets were structured to direct and 
control the search effort.  It did not have the capacity to process collected intelligence and 
produce actionable intelligence.  This manifested an underdeveloped collection plans that 
were inconsistently employed by the survey teams.   
Although the WMD operation in Iraq had problems, DoD should incorporate 
some aspects of the operation in future missions.  Many of the TTPs and reporting 
procedures transcended the 75th XTF and were used during the ISG operations.  The OIF 
WMD elimination operation demonstrated that of the three task comprising WMD 
elimination (exploitation, destruction, and monitoring), exploitation is probably the only 
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phase that can reasonably be done during hostilities.  This phase is also the most 
challenging because of the inherent risk associated with WMD combined with combat 
related hazards.  Security requirements impede the accomplishment of the other two 
phases. 
 
D. “FRUSTRATED, U.S. ARMY TEAM TO LEAVE IRAQ”: ISG TAKES 
OVER SEARCH (JUNE 2003–SEPTEMBER 2004) 
On 11 May 2003, the Washington Post published an article by Barton Gellman 
detailing the 75th XTF’s failure to discover any confirming evidence of Iraq’s WMD.104  
In doing so, Gellman not only described the frustration of the members of the 75th XTF, 
but probably those of the Bush administration as well.  Realizing the shortcoming of the 
first ad hoc task force, DOD assembled the Iraq Survey Group, the largest weapons 
elimination organization in history.  Dr. Stephen Cambone, Undersecretary of Defense 
for Intelligence was responsible for establishing the ISG.105  Subsequently, the ownership 
of the search shifted from the Undersecretary for Counterproliferation Policy, the office 
that oversaw the creation of the ISG.  Future exploitation operations must have the same 
level of intelligence support as the ISG.      
The ISG was a large organization consisting of between 900–1,400 weapons 
experts and support personnel from the United States, Great Britain, and Australia.  It 
operated in Iraq from June 2003–September 2004 and incorporated former members of 
UNSCOM.  DoD structured the ISG to take a comprehensive approach for finding 
weapons in Iraq.  While the 75th XTF primarily targeted sites, the ISG targeted programs 
in order to gain a full accounting of Iraq’s WMD.  It was a balanced approach to 
eliminating WMD, integrating site exploitation, interrogations, and data/document 
exploitation to put the WMD jigsaw puzzle together.106   
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The ISG was composed of decentralized analytical teams.  These teams 
nominated targets to a targeting board for approval.  Once approved, the analyst would 
integrate with what the ISG called mobile contact team (MCT) to conduct the mission.107  
This process integrated the analyst throughout the process rather than just at the 
beginning of the process.  Unlike the 75th XTF’s search, the ISG conducted its weapons 
search under semi-permissive conditions.  Nevertheless, there were still challenges from 
the rising insurgency necessitating a security detail to protect ISG members during 
inspections.  Moreover, like the 75th XTF, looted and destroyed sites hampered the ISG’s 
search efforts.  Key aspects of the “paper trail” were missing—destroyed by either the 
Baath party officials, coalition forces or the looters. 
Through an immense effort, the ISG determined that although Saddam Hussein 
had a great appreciation for WMD, Iraq had no credible weapons program.  On January 
28, 2004, the DCI’s special advisor, David Kay, stated that “we were almost all wrong” 
about the Iraqi weapons program.  In September 2005, the ISG released its final report 
officially confirming Kay’s words.  The ISG’s report closed the door on Iraq’s weapons 
program, but the debate on a need for a permanent elimination capability remains open.  
Certainly, DOD’s original weapons elimination concept had some degree of validity.  
While the ISG better addressed the requirements for WMD eliminations, forming such an 
organization cannot operate under non-permissive conditions.  DoD must have the 
capacity to conduct weapons elimination operations across the spectrum of conflict.  In 
order to do this, it must capture and apply the lessons learned from the 75th XTF’s 
nonpermissive WMD elimination operation as well as those from the ISG’s semi-
permissive operation.   
 
E. CONCLUSION:  THE PROBLEMS WITH  AD HOC APPROACHES  
Although the United States can dominate across the spectrum of conventional 
warfare, being improperly prepared to conduct a comprehensive WMD elimination 
campaign could jeopardize the safety of U.S. forces and be detrimental to the U.S. 
                                                 
107  Marcus J. Wilson, Sr., “Anatomy of the Hunt for Weapons of Mass Destruction.” 
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national security interests.  Just like the UN’s, the U.S. WMD elimination effort also 
experienced problems that are attributable to the novelty of compelling WMD 
compliance.  DoD’s initial concept produced by the Office of the Undersecretary for 
Counterproliferation—manifested as the 75th XTF—came under scrutiny when it did not 
discover any WMD in Iraq.  After President Bush declared initial hostilities over, DoD 
fielded the ISG under the auspices of the Undersecretary for Intelligence.   
The fact that the ISG also failed to disclose any WMD, give some validity to the 
75th XTF and the concept of searching for WMD under nonpermissive conditions.  
Nonetheless, several factors that dilute the validity of the concept warrant close 
examination.  Among them are the lack of interpreters, poor reachback capability, 
securing high priority sites, and challenges of detecting biological agents.  The ISG was a 
much more balanced approach to the problem the 75th XTF was having in Iraq.  
Particularly, it had greater “hands-on” intelligence aspects that enabled it to systemically 
attach Iraq’s WMD program, not just search locations for WMD.   
This thesis proposes that in order to avoid a reliance on ad hoc approaches toward 
this counterproliferation mission in the future, DoD must develop a permanent WMD 
elimination capability that is both viable and sustainable.  This can be accomplished by 
centralizing responsibility for conducting this mission; ensuring it is delineated in the 
deliberate planning process; and including the mission as part of the strategic planning 
guidance, contingency planning guidance, and the budget development process.108  
Towards this end, the 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review designated the 20th Support 
Command (CBRNE) as the designated Joint Task Force to provide command and control 
of the WMD elimination mission.  While this appointment designates an element to lead 
the elimination mission, it may still leave U.S. forces unprepared if measures are not 
taken to ensure the capability is viable and sustainable.     
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IV. ESTABLISHING A VIABLE AND SUSTAINABLE WMD 
ELIMINATION CAPABILITY 
A. INTRODUCTION 
The WMD elimination operation in Iraq demonstrated that the U.S. military was 
inadequately prepared for the operational-level arms control required to compel 
compliance with disarmament decisions.  Subsequently, DoD has made significant 
progress in articulating the new operational-level mission requirements.  In his 2006 
Quadrennial Defense Review, Secretary of Defense, Donald Rumsfield discussed plans to 
assign responsibility for providing command and control of future WMD elimination 
operations to the 20th Support Command (CBRNE).  Additionally, he advocated 
expanding the capability of U.S. forces to render safe material related to WMD and 
tasked U.S. Strategic Command (STRATCOM) with the new mission of leading the 
effort to combat weapons of mass destruction.109  Although, these initiatives promote the 
development of a standing capability to conduct WMD elimination, DoD must also treat 
the operational and tactical gaps identified in the aftermath of the OIF elimination 
mission.  Identifying the 20th Support Command (CBRNE) to lead the WMD elimination 
operations solves only one piece of the elimination puzzle.  In order to facilitate 
institutionalizing the WMD elimination mission, DoD requires not only a permanent task 
force for command and control, but a force structure with dedicated assets to conduct the 
most critical task of elimination—assessment/exploitation—across the spectrum of 
conflict. 
This chapter delineates measures DoD must consider in its continual 
development, integration and institutionalization of the WMD elimination mission as a 
functional means of conducting operational-level arms control missions as a permanent 
military capability.  It first looks at DoD’s current efforts to develop a standing capability 
to lead the WMD elimination mission.  Next, it looks at the strategic, operational, and 
tactical requirements for integrating the elimination mission within the mission scope of  
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the U.S. military.  It then suggests and discusses specific roles and responsibilities of the 
U.S. Army and Doctrine Command in developing and integrating a core competency for 
WMD elimination.  Finally, it examines some potential impediments to DoD’s strategy to 
establish a standing WMD elimination capability.   
 
B. TOWARDS DEVELOPING A STANDING WMD ELIMINATION 
CAPABILITY 
Two key undertakings towards developing a standing elimination capability have 
been the formalization of joint operational guidelines for combating WMD and the 
designation of the 20th Support Command (CBRNE) as the lead organization to command 
and control military assets during operations to combat WMD.  These undertakings 
provide both the strategic scope and formal assignment for conducting 
counterproliferation mission to include WMD elimination operations.     
1. Formalizing Joint Operational Concepts for Combating WMD 
Joint Publication 3-40, Joint Doctrine for Combating Weapons of Mass 
Destruction, set forth principle guidelines for planning and conducting operations to 
combat WMD and their delivery systems.110  It was one of the first post-OIF documents 
to formally recognize and categorize WMD elimination as an important mission in 
support of counterproliferation operations.  Building on the elimination concept used 
during OIF, it refined the concept of WMD elimination by delineating four steps: 
isolation, exploitation, destruction, and monitoring and redirection.   
Joint Publications 3-40 circumscribes the strategic scope under which 
organizations tasked to combat WMD must be capable of operating.    Joint Publication 
3-40 also recognizes the deterrent effect of establishing and demonstrating a strong 
capability to conduct mission to combat WMD through joint, multinational, Service 
Component training exercises that will “serve as a visible reminder of U.S. capability.”111  
Additionally, the National Military Strategy to Combating Weapons of Mass Destruction 
                                                 
110 Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Publication 3-40, Joint Doctrine for Combating Weapons of 
Mass Destruction, (July 8, 2004).  
111  Ibid.  
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released in February 2006 further refined the role of WMD elimination in regards to the 
nonproliferation/counterproliferation spectrum of missions.  It clearly enounced the 
strategic military framework consisting of the “ends, ways, and means of addressing the 
challenges of combating WMD.” 112     
DoD added the mission of combating weapons of mass destruction to 
STRATCOM’s mission scope in 2005.113  In collaboration with the Defense Threat 
Reduction Agency, STRATCOM has established the STRATCOM Center for Combating 
WMD (SCC-WMD) located at Fort Belvoir, Virginia.  A key function of SCC-WMD is 
the integration and synchronization of DoD and interagency support of missions to 
combat WMD.  SCC-WMD will “plan, advocate, and advise combatant commands on 
WMD-related matters, to include doctrine, organization, training, material, leadership, 
personnel, and facilities.”114    
2. No More Pickup Games: The Development of the 20th Support 
Command  
The 2006 QDR announced that DoD would consolidate its specialized assets to 
combat WMD under one formal command designated as the 20th Support Command 
(CBRNE).  This command was activated on October 16, 2005, and is located at Aberdeen 
Proving Grounds, Maryland.  The 20th Support Command will provide oversight of the 
U.S. Army’s technical assets during operations to combat WMD.  Another specific 
capability of the command includes offering reachback capabilities to interact with DoD 
and other federal agencies’ subject matter experts.115  Once it reaches full operational 
capability, the command could provide forensic sampling to domestic law enforcement  
                                                 
112   DoD, National Military Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction. 
113  Wade Boese and Miles A. Pomper, “Strategic Decisions: An Interview with STRATCOM 
 Commander General James E. Cartwright,” Arms Control Today 36, no. 5 (June 2006), 
http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2006_06/CartwrightInterview.asp.  (accessed July 13, 2006).  
114  Inside Defense.Com, “STRATCOM Statement on Opening of WMD Command Center,” 
 http://www.insidedefense.com/secure/defense_docnum.asp?f=defense_2002.ask&docnum=dplus2006_
1635&q.  (accessed July12, 2006).  
115  Brenk Bankus, “US Army Centralizes its Response to Terroirst Attacks,”  Janes, May 2, 2006, 
http://www.janes.com/defence/news/rusi/rjhm060502_1_n.shtml.  (accessed July 11, 2006). 
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responding to a WMD attack.  The 20th Support Command (CBRNE) will develop a rapid 
deployment capacity to serve as a Joint Task Force (JTF) to control WMD elimination by 
2007.116   
The 20th Support Command’s subordinate units include the 52nd Ordnance 
Group, Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD), 71st Ordnance Group, 48th Chemical 
Brigade, the 111th Ordnance Group (Army National Guard), and operational control of 
U.S. Army reserve units when activated for WMD consequence management support.117  
Additionally, the Department of the Army (DoA) has given the 20th Support Command 
interim training and readiness oversight (TRO) authority over all U.S. Army reserve EOD 
units when they are not on active status.  TRO authority enables the 20th Support 
Command to influence all matters affecting the training and readiness of reserve 
component units in fulfilling its mission of providing or assisting in the training and 
readiness oversight of CBRNE assets (Active, Guard, and Reserve).   
Regarding weapons elimination, the command will have the capacity to serve as a 
Joint Task Force capable of rapid deployment in order to provide command and control 
of WMD elimination and site exploitation missions—the role filled by the 75th XTF 
during OIF.118  Besides the obvious benefits of not being an ad hoc organization, another 
advantage of the 20th Support Command’s structure is that it has direct authority over 
organic Explosive Ordinance Disposal (EOD) assets.  EOD assets are a critical part of the 
elimination operations because of their integral role of rendering-safe various munitions, 
unexploded ordnance (UXO), and improvised explosive devises (IED).  As tactics, 
techniques, and procedures evolved during the OIF elimination operation, the role and 
responsibility of EOD personnel assigned to SAT/MET and the MCT emerged as the 
preeminent element for conducting searches.     
 
                                                 
116  DoD, Quadrennial Defense Review Report, February 6, 2006, 52.       
117  20th Support Command, “Army Activates 20th Support Command,” RDECOM Magazine, 
November 2004, http://www.rdecom.army.mil/rdemagazine/200411/itf_20thsupport.html (accessed July 2, 
2006).   
118  CBRNE refers to chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, and high explosives, the response 
capabilities of the 20th Support Command.   
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C. INTEGRATING WMD ELIMINATION INTO THE MISSION SCOPE OF 
U.S. FORCES 
The U.S. military is currently undergoing a period of transformation in order to 
provide a “wider range of military options to discourage aggression any form of coercion 
against the United States, our allies, and our friends.”119  The U.S. military is are a very 
obstinate institution; simple changes in the military are often met with staunch resistance.  
For example, when U.S. Army Chief of Staff General Eric Shinseki decided to change 
the U.S. Army headgear to the black beret as a symbol of transformation, he could not 
have anticipated the backlash of opposition.  New operational requirements may also 
meet with resistance when they encroach on standard operations.  Commanders were 
somewhat unsettled by the security requirements of the OIF elimination mission, may 
have been reluctant to divert assets from objectives seen as more important.  Nonetheless, 
the post-911 conflicts have clearly demonstrated the need to transform the force structure.  
In order to integrate the WMD elimination mission into this new force structure, DOD 
must emphasize the mission at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels of operations.  
1. At the Strategic Level 
At the strategic level, DoD must incorporate the elimination mission into its 
military transformation strategy.  DoD’s Office of Military Transformation has identified 
four pillars of military transformation—strengthening joint operations; exploiting U.S. 
intelligence advantages; concept development and experimentation; and developing 
transformational capabilities.120  DoD must carefully evaluate the new mission of WMD 
elimination through the prisms of each pillar of transformation to assure that the latest 
technological innovations are available to forces assigned to conduct elimination 
missions.121     
JP 3-40, Joint Doctrine for Combating Weapons of Mass Destruction aptly states 
that many of the technical skill required to conduct an elimination mission are low 
                                                 
119  DoD Office of Military Transformation, Military Transformation, A Strategic Approach, Fall 
2003, http://www.oft.osd.mil/library/library_files/document_297_MT_StrategyDoc1.pdf, (accessed 21 
April 2006).  
120  Ibid.  
121   Rebecca K.C. Hersman, July 27, 2006 interview with author.  
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density and costly to establish and maintain.122  Therefore, in order to facilitate combined 
operations, DoD should encourage allies and friends to also develop the expertise 
required for WMD elimination.  Even if allied forces decline to participate in combat 
operations, they may be capable and willing to contribute to the destruction and/or 
monitoring phases of the elimination process.   
Furthermore, the United States should also encourage the United Nations to 
maintain the verification capability it established to conduct verification inspections in 
Iraq.  The UN possessed an experienced verification capability during its extensive 
operations in Iraq under the UNSCOM and UNMOVIC regimes.  A standing UN 
verification capability would garner more credibility and respect from member-state than 
the ad hoc approaches employed by the UN verification programs used in Iraq.  In 
addition, in support of U.S.-led elimination operation of an adversary’s WMD, the UN 
verification capability could conduct the continuous monitoring and ongoing inspections 
in support of phase III of WMD elimination, relieving the United States of this 
responsibility.  
DoD’s weapons elimination capability may also assist in the consequence 
management of domestic WMD incidents in support of homeland security.  Consequence 
management is one of the three pillars identified by the National Military Strategy for 
Combating Weapons of Mass Destruction in which U.S. forces may be called upon to 
conduct.  There are numerous tasks associated with the pillar of consequence 
management which crosscut those associated with counterproliferation—particularly the 
tasks of assessment, rendering safe, and transportation of WMD.  Because of the mutual 
benefits, DoD and the Department of Homeland Security could collaborate to develop 
and refine common tactics, techniques, and procedures associated with WMD elimination 
and consequence management.  Finally, senior government officials must ensure that 
combating WMD remains a high priority for DoD and other government agencies and  
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that adequate funding remain available.  If senior level officials are not knowledgeable 
about the need for a WMD elimination mission, it is unlikely that it will continue to 
receive the sustained funding it requires.123  
2. At the Operational Level 
DoD must ensure that the elimination mission is integrated into the deliberate 
planning process directing each Combatant Commander to assess their area of 
responsibility for likely contingency operations that may require a WMD elimination 
mission.124  Strategic and contingency plans should also include WMD elimination as a 
standard annex for operational level planning.  In addition, Combatant Commanders 
should include WMD elimination mission in operational exercises—such as Ulchi Focus 
Lens (UFL)—in order to flush out operational impact of the mission. 125   Combatant 
Commanders should also exercise their WMD elimination contingencies during exercises 
with allies and regional security partners in order for further familiarization with the 
concept of the mission.   
Combatant Commander must ensure elimination plans have a balanced approach 
toward exploitation of sites, people, and data.126  The 75th XTF-led elimination mission 
focused primarily on exploiting locations and sites in its search for WMD.  It was not 
structured to capitalize and quickly adjust its search based on intelligence gathered during 
its searches.  The ISG corrected this shortfall by focusing more on Iraq’s WMD programs 
and the personnel assigned to work on these programs.   
Combatant Commander must also recognize the need to combine WMD 
counterforce and elimination operations when appropriate.  Although potential 
adversaries are increasing their ability to work underground and therefore mitigating the 
effectiveness of conventional weaponry, commanders may still occasionally integrate 
                                                 
123  Center for the Study of Combating Weapons of Mass Destruction, “Combating WMD: Challenge 
for the Next 10 Years,” 47–51. 
124  Ibid.  
125  ULCHI FOCUS LENS (UFL) is a South Korean-US Combined Forces Command (CFC) 
simulation driven, OPLAN-oriented command post exercise (CPX) conducted annually. 
126  Rebecca K.C. Hersman and Todd M. Koca, “Eliminating Adversary WMD: Lessons for Future 
Conflicts,”  9.  
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counterforce options into the elimination mission in order to destroy an adversary’s 
WMD program.  Given that the use of unconventional targeting (nuclear weapons) is an 
unlikely scenario, incorporating counterforce strikes into the elimination mission can 
drastically increase the probability of success.  
3. At the Tactical Level       
At the tactical level, unit level training represents the best avenue for integrating 
the WMD elimination mission.  Although some commanders may consider it a 
distraction from warfighting, exercises in support of elimination mission should be 
integrated into training scenarios at the National Training Center (NTC) and the Joint 
Readiness Training Center (JRTC).  The four phases of WMD elimination—isolation, 
exploitation, destruction, monitoring/inspections—are comprised of numerous critical 
collective task and individual tasks.  Familiarization and exposure to the mission will 
increase both commander’s and soldier’s confidence in the mission and facilitate mission 
integration. 
DoD must ensure that respective service training and indoctrination centers 
integrate training of the elimination mission at the appropriate service schools.  It should 
instruct entry-level service members designated to serve in positions that may be 
involved in WMD elimination mission on the tactics, techniques, and procedures of 
WMD elimination.  Exposing responsible service members to the elimination mission 
early and often will develop a generation of soldiers that are comfortable with the 
mission.   
 
D. INSTITUTIONALIZING WMD ELIMINATION:  EMBEDDING THE 
MISSION AS A CORE COMPETENCY 
“Victory starts here!”  This is the motto of the United States Army Training and 
Doctrine Command (TRADOC) and the key to perpetuating a capability to conduct 
elimination operations.  In addition to developing a designated command and integrating 
the WMD elimination into the mission scope of U.S. military forces through training and 
planning processes, DoD must also institutionalize the WMD elimination mission in 
order to perpetuate it as a functional task.  TRADOC operates two schools that are 
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responsible for training several of the intricate tasks associated with the WMD 
elimination mission.  These schools—the U.S. Army Chemical School (USACMLS) and 
the U.S. Army Ordnance Center and Schools (USAOCS)—are responsible for training 
soldiers on several critical tasks associated with WMD elimination including rendering 
safe munitions, detection, neutralization, and transportation, and destruction of hazardous 
material.   
Embedding WMD elimination as a collective task within these branches will 
create a core competency for conducting the mission and propagate the tactics, 
techniques, and procedures amongst new service members entering the service and others 
as they rotate through professional development schools.  These schools must also work 
closely with SSC-WMD as it continues to refine the operational aspects of WMD 
elimination.  The synergistic effect resulting from embedding the elimination mission 
within these branches will facilitate the institutionalization of the WMD mission. 
 
E. SIGNIFICANT CHALLENGES  
Given the nascence and unpredictability of the WMD elimination mission, DoD 
will face some significant challenges in establishing a viable and sustainable elimination 
capability.  This section examines three challenges that DoD must address.   
1. Locating WMD 
The purpose of the exploitation/assessment phase of the WMD elimination 
mission is to locate, characterize, secure, and render safe WMD material, weapons, 
equipment, personnel, and infrastructure.127  Locating WMD material is undoubtedly the 
most demanding aspect of this phase and imposes significant challenges.  Although 
detailed intelligence may mitigate this challenge to some extent, it does not discount the 
need for specialized training and equipment.  Since each category of WMD—chemical, 
biological, radiological, nuclear, and high explosives—requires varying levels of 
expertise to locate, it is not feasible to rely solely on general-purpose forces to conduct 
phase I of the WMD elimination operation.   
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During the OIF elimination operations, the 75th XTF primarily used its site 
assessment teams for the task of locating WMD.  While these teams had received 
specialized training above the levels of “general-purpose” forces, they did not posses the 
depth of expertise that may be required for future elimination operations.128  The post-
conflict insurgency in Iraq accentuates the need for U.S. forces to expeditiously locate 
and secure an adversary’s weapons cache.  Considering the interdiction learning curve 
(figure 1), the next WMD elimination mission will require greater involvement of subject 
matter expertise than was employed during OIF.     
The 20th Support Command is not necessarily structured to field site assessment 
teams.  It is composed of low-density/high demand assets that may augment search teams 
during operations, but is primarily responsible for technical assistance.  It is not clear, 
what assets the 20th Support Command will use to conduct phase I of the elimination 
operation.  If general-purpose forces are used, DoD must ensure that they receive 
specialized training catered to the specific category of WMD they are attempting to 
locate.  Although the use of general-purpose forces does not necessarily prohibit success, 
the lack of specialized training to locate WMD material may degrade the thoroughness 
and expediency of searches.    
This is especially the case regarding biological programs.  Subject matter experts 
should augment search teams given the specialized knowledge and training that is 
required to ensure successful exploitation.  Exploiting Iraq’s biological program proved 
problematic for both UNSCOM/UNMOVIC and for the United States during its WMD 
elimination operation in Iraq.  Since biological weapons and its related material present 
such an insurmountable challenge, DoD must ensure that biological expertise is 
integrated into its elimination capability at the lowest levels.   
The lack of specialized equipment may also thwart efforts to locate WMD and its 
related material.  The 75th XTF’s survey teams were equipped with little more than 
standard issue military equipment to detect WMD material. For biological detection, the 
teams were equipped with cumbersome bioassay kits, which very few members could 
                                                 
128 Regarding WMD elimination, the term “general-purpose forces” refers forces not specifically 
trained to conduct the technical tasks associated with the elimination mission.     
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master.  DoD must make a considerable investment to ensure that teams searching for 
WMD are well equipped with the best detection equipment available.  Again, biological 
weapons present a particularly difficult detection challenge because of the number of 
potential agents, dual-use aspects, and their lack of standoff signatures.  Although, 
several companies are currently working to develop a hand-held biological detection—
most conducive for nonpermissive operations—this capability is still in the research and 
development stage.   
2. Shifting Political Focus 
With the terrorist attack of September 11, 2001 as a backdrop, the Bush 
administration has made a concerted effort to account for the radicalism–technology 
nexus.  This emphasis has contributed to the development of the most detailed strategy 
for combating WMD in the history of the United States.  Nonetheless, future 
administrations may reprioritize DoD’s counterproliferation structure, shifting focus 
away from a standing WMD elimination capability.  This is why it is critical that DoD 
institutionalize the WMD elimination mission so that soldiers are continually exposed to 
the task even if no formal force structure is designated to conduct the mission.  
3.  Intelligence Support for WMD Elimination 
Intelligence support is the Achilles hill of the WMD elimination operations.129  
During the Operation Iraqi Freedom, as search of selected sites continually failed to 
produce tangible results, the elimination effort started to loose focus.  Once the Iraqi 
Survey Group took over the search, it focused on WMD programs and personnel.  Timely 
processing of information collected during its exploitation built flexibility into the 
elimination process and facilitated more detailed and structured searches that were less 
“site-centric.” 
Operational-level intelligence support for WMD elimination must reduce 
uncertainty by exploiting a variety of sources, facilitating information sharing, and 
improving situational awareness.130  The intelligence cell of the standing elimination 
capability must be robust enough to produce actionable intelligence without being overly 
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reliant on reachback sources to the point of stagnation.  This will require plug-and-play 
augmentation from deployable subject matter experts from throughout the intelligence 
community.  To facilitate this, DoD should routinely integrate intelligence production 
organizations such as the Missile and Space Intelligence Center (MSIC), the Armed 
Forces Medical Intelligence Center (AFMIC), National Ground Intelligence Center 
(NGIC), and other specialized elements within the Defense Intelligence Agency into 
WMD elimination training and simulation exercises.  Establishing inveterate working 
relationships between the intelligence community and its standing WMD elimination 
capability will mitigate the piecemeal nature of intelligence support.   
4.  Potential Mission Growth   
Mission expansion is another significant challenge to establishment of a viable 
and sustainable elimination capability.  Given the costly investment DoD is making in its 
ability to combat WMD, future DoD leadership working with competitive defense 
budgets may seek to expand the capability’s mission scope.  Currently, DoD already 
expects the 20th Support Command (CBRNE) to provide support to other combating 
WMD missions such as consequence management and WMD interdiction.131  While 
these secondary responsibilities are congenital to the command’s capability, expanding 
its mission scope may detract from the original intent of the command.    
One possible addition to the mission scope of the command may be ports-of-entry 
screening.  Only a small percentage of the shipping containers entering through U.S. 
maritime ports-of-entry are subject to inspection.  Additionally, each year more than 2.5 
million railcars and 5.7 million cargo containers must be inspected at the border. 132  
Current growth predictions indicate that these figures will quadruple in the next twenty 
years.  DoD’s role in homeland security has recently increased with the addition of the 
southern boarder patrol mission.  As DoD’s homeland security role continues to increase,  
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the 20th Support Command (CBRNE) mission may be called upon to assist in pre-
screening containers arriving U.S. ports-of-entry.  Its use could be at random or based on 
intelligence assessments.     
DoD could also call upon the command to augment stability operations by 
conducting the elimination of small arms and light weapons (SALW).133  The targeted 
weapons include both small arms manufactured to military specification and other light 
weapons such as antiaircraft ordnance, landmines, and rockets.  In many areas of the 
world, the proliferation of SALW poses a much greater and immediate threat to peace 
and security than the proliferation of WMD.  Although not a priority of the United States, 
as the weight and recognition of this issue increases, the shifting focus of the 
international community may lend credence to juxtaposing both SALW and WMD 
elimination onto the same spectrum of weapons elimination (see Figure 8).  
 
SALW Elimination 
in support of peace 




in support compelled 
compliance
Support for Cooperative Reduction of WMD
Spectrum of Weapons Elimination
 
Figure 8  Spectrum of Weapons Elimination.  DoD’s permanent elimination 
 capability could provide support across the entire spectrum of weapons 
 elimination. 
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In many negotiated settlements, belligerents often make disarmament agreements 
as a condition of peace.  Although frequently attempted, peace enforcers rarely conduct 
SALW disarmament properly.  They fail to establish positive control over confiscated 
weapons and/or to eliminate excess weapons.  Many of the weapons are illegally 
redistributed, serving only to undermine an already weaken security environment.   
Given its projected assets and mission scope, the 20th Support Command could 
easily conduct the mission of SALW elimination into its mission scope during stability 
operations involving U.S. forces.  Currently, the Defense Threat Reduction Agency 
(DTRA) provides technical support to the Department of State and geographical 
combatant commanders during SALW operations.  DTRA advises foreign governments 
on practices for physical security and stockpile management of SALW. 134  The 20th 
Support Command could augment this effort by providing a deployable command 
structure prepared to conduct this mission under semi-permissive or nonpermissive 
conditions.  During stability, support, transition and reconstruction (SSTR) operations 
involving U.S. forces, the expert capacity of an element trained and prepared to conduct 
SALW elimination would be a value-added asset for a task force commander.   
 
F. CONCLUSION 
This chapter examines some of the issues DoD must consider to meet its objective 
of establishing a permanent WMD elimination capability.  It asserts that in order to create 
a viable and sustainable capability, DoD must take a synergistic approach focusing not 
only on developing the capability, but also on integrating the mission into the mission 
scope of U.S. forces and institutionalizing the mission as a core competency within the 
proponents responsible for conducting its technical tasks.   
DoD has established the 20th Support Command to provide command and control 
of WMD elimination mission and to provide technical support to other 
counterproliferation and nonproliferation missions as required.  The 20th Support 
Command (CBRNE) has EOD and chemical support assets under its operational control.  
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This will negate the “pick-up game” predilection that DoD too often displays towards 
low occurrence/high impact operations, but may fall short of long-term objectives it the 
WMD elimination mission is not integrated and institutionalized.  Within the U.S. 
military, new operational requirements are often met with initial resistance.  
Incorporating elimination operations into strategic, operational, and tactical level 
planning will ensure the mission is integrated into the scope of U.S. military missions.  
Integrating the mission into operational and tactical level training exercises is also critical 
to the success of the mission.  This exposure will increase the understanding of the 
mission amongst commanders and better enable them to allocate support for elimination 
operations.   
TRADOC is responsible for recruiting and training new soldiers, developing 
adaptive leaders, and maximizing institutional learning and adaptation.  It plays a key 
role in institutionalizing the WMD elimination mission within the force structure.  In 
order to develop a core competency for conducting the elimination mission, TRADOC 
must formally embed the mission within the functional components responsible for 
conducting the intricate technical tasks associated with WMD elimination.  Although the 
standing WMD elimination capability will endure many trials, four will be particularly 
significant.  These are 1) locating WMD caches and related material, 2) enduring shifts in 
political focus, 3) integrating the necessary intelligence support, and 4) mission 
expansion.  DoD must address each of these key challenges in order to establish a viable 
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V. CONCLUSION:  PREPARING FOR THE NEXT WMD 
ELIMINATION MISSION 
A. INTRODUCTION 
The disarmament terms imposed by the United Nations on Iraq at the end of the 
1991 Persian Gulf War serves as the paradigm case for compelled compliance with 
disarmament mandates.  Iraq unconditionally accepted the terms of the United Nations 
Security Council (UNSC) Resolution 687135.  The stipulations of UNSC Resolution 687, 
section C required Iraq to “unconditionally accept the destruction, removal, or rending 
harmless under international supervision of all chemical and biological weapons and 
stocks; all ballistic missiles with ranges greater than 150 kilometers.”136  Furthermore, 
paragraph 9 (b) of the resolution authorize the establishment of UNSCOM to “carry out 
immediate on-site inspection of Iraq’s biological, chemical, and missile capabilities” 
based on Iraq’s declarations and any other locations designated by UNSCOM.137   
As the UN/Iraq cooperative effort broke down, Iraq halted all inspection in 
October 1998.  Inspections resumed under the auspices of UNMOVIC, but could not 
assuage the perception that the regime of Saddam Hussein was not being forthcoming 
with the truth about its WMD programs.  The September 2001 terrorist attacks against the 
United States by Al Quaeda operatives provided the impetuous for the U.S. President 
George W. Bush to invade Iraq in order to compel compliance with the UN’s 
disarmament mandate.  In order to execute this disarmament mission, DoD had to form 
an ad hoc element designed to systematically locate, characterize, secure, disable, and/or 
destroy Iraq’s WMD stockpiles and related materials.   
This thesis recommends that DoD establish a permanent WMD elimination 
capability that is both viable and sustainable.  In previous chapters, it examined why the 
                                                 
135  United Nations Security Council Resolution 687 was adopted at the 2981st meeting on April 3, 
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United States cannot rely solely on cooperation-based models of disarmament such as 
UNSCOM and UNMOVIC for WMD elimination; but must also posses the capacity to 
conduct coercive disarmament of an adversary.  It has also discussed the perils of relying 
on ad hoc approaches to accomplish this mission and recommended measures DoD 
should undertake in pursuit of establishing this capability.  The following sections 
summarize the thesis discussions, findings and highlight its recommendations.  
 
B.  SUMMARY OF DISCUSSION AND FINDINGS 
1. The Significance of the WMD Elimination Issue 
DoD’s National Military Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction 
delineates eight missions that the U.S. military must have the capacity to conduct in order 
to dissuade, deter, defend, and defeat adversaries seeking to use WMD against U.S. 
interests.  These missions are: conduct passives defense, cooperative threat reduction, 
security cooperation and partner activities, interdiction operations, active defense, 
consequence management, and WMD elimination.138  These missions comprise the 
spectrum of nonproliferation/counterproliferation operations with WMD elimination 
being the ultimate counterproliferation mission.  WMD elimination is defined as 
operations conducted to systematically locate, characterize, secure, disable, and/or 
destroy a State or non-State actor’s WMD program and related capabilities in a hostile or 
uncertain environment.139  Traditionally, many military strategists would have termed 
offensive operations such Israel’s 1981 counterforce strike against Iraq’s Osirak nuclear 
reactor as an elimination mission.  While elimination missions may include counterforce 
strikes, it entails a more comprehensive destruction, dismantlement, and in depth 
verification of an adversary’s WMD capabilities.   
Considering today’s security environment, it is imperative to decrease the degree 
of uncertainty to the maximum extent possible.  Proliferation of the technology and skills 
to construct hardened and deeply buried sites mitigates counterforce air strikes to the 
point that they may not obtain the degree of certainty required in today’s security 
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environment.  As determined adversaries employ the knowledge they have gained from 
previous preemptive counterforce operations, the difficulty of destroying these stockpiles 
using counterforce air strikes alone will only increase.  Analysts suspect that both North 
Korea and Iran are currently employing hardened and deeply buried targets in 
anticipation of U.S. use of counterforce air strikes against their nuclear assets.140   
2.  The Limits of Cooperative Disarmament 
In retrospect, the UN-led disarmament verification regime was able to achieve the 
demands of UN Security Council Resolution 687.  Nonetheless, it was unable to verify its 
achievements to the satisfaction of all the member-states.  This thesis found that there are 
three key factors contributing to the failure of the UN-led cooperative disarmament of 
Iraq and underscore the need for DoD to posses a permanent capability to conduct WMD 
elimination.  First, Iraq’s early tactics of denial and deception irreparably tainted the UN-
led cooperative process.  Neither of the UN-led regimes was able to recover from this 
transgression enough to regain the trust of all the member-states.  Secondly is the 
difficulty of reaching a consensus on what is a satisfactory level of disarmament.  UN 
member-states had varying views on the threat that Iraq presented.  After the terrorist 
attacks of September 11, 2001, the U.S. perspective was that Iraq disarmament had to be 
comprehensive and complete.  Finally, even if a consensus were reached, the UN 
Security Council may not be willing to employ coercive disarmament.  While 
cooperative, nonproliferation approaches to disarmament are preferred, DoD must posses 
a standing capability that would facilitate the coercive disarmament of U.S. adversaries.  
3. The Problems with Ad Hoc Approaches 
This thesis has advocated that the U.S. military cannot rely on ad hoc approaches 
to conduct the WMD elimination mission.  Preparing for the invasion of Iraq, DoD was 
forced to employ ad hoc means to develop its initial elimination task force responsible for 
directing the search for Iraq’s weapons.  This thesis has examined DoD’s formulation of 
the WMD elimination plan for Operation Iraqi Freedom and looks at Central Command’s 
(CENTCOM) strategy for conducting weapons exploitation in conjunction with the 
warfight.  It looked at the transformation of the elimination strategy as the mission  
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transitioned from the 75th XTF to the Iraqi Survey Group and proposed that the any new 
WMD elimination JTF must take a similar “balanced” approach to the elimination 
mission. 
This thesis discussed several findings concerning the Operation Iraqi Freedom 
WMD elimination operation in Iraq.  Many of the problems associated with the operation 
are attributable to the novelty and uniqueness of the mission of WMD elimination.  
Nonetheless, others are directly attributable to the ad hoc approach that DoD had to rely 
on to develop the capability.  DOD’s permanent elimination capability should capture 
and address all the following issues: 
• the lack of prioritization for the elimination mission  
• the need for interpreter support at the lowest level of operation 
• the lack of reliable reachback capability 
• the lack of integrated training between the exploitation task force and 
maneuver elements 
• securing high priority sites  
• the loss of focus immediately following the end of initial hostilities, 
• the need to integrate biological experts at the lowest levels  
• the need for a robust intelligence cell  
4. Towards a Viable and Sustainable WMD Elimination Capability  
This thesis found that DoD is making remarkable strides towards addressing the 
capability gaps presented by challenges of combating weapons of mass destruction.  The 
formalization of joint operational concept for combating WMD is a key development in 
addressing the capability shortfalls made evident after during the OIF elimination 
operation.  Joint Publication 3-40, Joint Doctrine for Combating Weapons of Mass 
Destruction, establishes principle guidelines for planning and conducting operations to 
combat WMD and their delivery systems.  Additionally, the National Military Strategy to 
Combating Weapons of Mass Destruction released in February 2006 further refined the 
role of WMD elimination in regards to the nonproliferation/counterproliferation spectrum 
of missions and offers overarching guidance to focus military efforts.141  Another key 
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development has been the establishment of the 20th Support Command (CBRNE) as the 
responsible element for leading future WMD elimination operations.  The command will 
provide oversight of the U.S. Army’s technical assets during operations to combat WMD.  
Its organic assets include key proponents necessary to conduct the elimination missions.  
Additionally, the 2006 QDR announced that DoD had assigned U.S. Strategic 
Command (STRATCOM) the mission of leading the effort to combat weapons of mass 
destruction.  STRATCOM Center for Combating WMD (SCC-WMD) will integrate and 
synchronize DoD and interagency support of mission to combat WMD.  It will “plan, 
advocate, and advise combatant commands on WMD-related matters to include doctrine, 
organization, training, material, leadership, personnel, and facilities.”142  While these are 
a very important step towards establishing a permanent WMD elimination capability, 
they do not completely address all the challenges of establishing a viable and sustainable 
capability.  Additionally, DoD must be cognizant of three significant challenges facing its 
standing WMD elimination capability.  These three challenges are locating weapons of 
mass destruction, shifting political focus, intelligence support, and potential mission 
expansion.  
 
C.  SUMMARY OF KEY RECOMMENDATIONS 
The strategic goal of DoD in combating WMD is to ensure that the United States, 
its armed forces, allies, partners, and interests are neither coerced nor attacked by 
enemies using WMD.143  Achieving this objective may ultimately require the 
employment of coercive means to compel uncooperative adversaries to comply with 
disarmament mandates from the international community or in the preemptive security 
interests of the United States.  Although the Iraq Survey Group’s final determination was 
that Iraq had no viable weapons program; Operation Iraqi Freedom validated the need for 
a permanent WMD elimination capability.  This thesis discussed several initiatives that 
DoD has launched in the aftermath of the OIF elimination operation.  These initiatives 
indicate that DoD has recognized its shortcomings and is taken the necessary measures to 
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account for the increasing threat that weapons of mass destruction present to the security 
interests of the United States.  This thesis has forwarded numerous comments and 
suggestion on how and why DoD should continue its pursuit of these objectives.  Some of 
the key recommendations offered are: 
1. Address the Challenges Presented by Biological Weapons. 
The search for biological agents is too critical and dangerous to be conducted by 
general-purpose forces with augmentation from subject matter experts.  While each 
category of WMD—chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, and high explosives—
require varying levels of expertise and equipment to detect, biological agents present the 
greatest challenge.  This was the case during both the UN-led cooperative disarmament 
and the OIF elimination operation.  Since biological weapons and its related material 
present such an insurmountable challenge for exploitation teams, DoD must ensure that 
robust biological expertise is integrated into its elimination capability.  
Biological experts augmenting the elimination capability will most likely come 
from outside organizations.  This underscores the recommendation for integrating 
training scenarios that incorporates all the “plug and play” participants of the elimination 
capability.144  Integrated training will allow biological experts the opportunity to train on 
and help develop the tactics, techniques, and procedures for conducting 
exploitation/assessment of biological sites.  Biological experts can also provide advice 
during phase II and III—destruction and monitoring—of WMD elimination.  Because of 
its dual-use capability, the input of biological experts will also facilitate targeted 
destruction of an adversary’s legitimate biological research assets.  Their participation in 
on-going monitoring programs of biological sites will also ensure that an adversary’s 
biological program remains in compliance with imposed limits.    
Additionally, the dearth of detection equipment to test for biological agents, 
compounds this problems.  Currently, other there is no “point and shoot” biological 
detection equipment suitable for exploitation detection teams working under 
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nonpermissive conditions.  DoD should also consider increasing its investments in 
ongoing research and development of hand-held biological detection equipment.  There 
are currently several companies working on this technology, but the capability is still in 
the development stage.   
2.  Address the Intelligence Requirements for WMD Elimination.  
This thesis recommends that DoD ensure that its permanent elimination capability 
has a robust intelligence capability structured for “plug and play” augmentation during 
deployments and exercises.  Operational-level intelligence support for WMD elimination 
must reduce uncertainty by exploiting a variety of sources, facilitating information 
sharing, and improving situational awareness.145  It should also have the capacity to 
produce actionable intelligence without being overly reliant on its reachback capability.   
 Nonetheless, when required, its reachback capability must be intrinsically 
affiliated with the appropriate assets within the intelligence community.  Additionally, 
given that intelligence is the Achilles hill of WMD elimination, reachback must be 
exhaustedly exercised during training scenarios to include its plug and play augmentation 
and reachback capacity.  Towards this end, DoD must fully integrate the applicable 
agencies into any training exercises that the permanent capability conducts or 
participates.   
Although DoD has made significant progress towards establishing a permanent 
WMD elimination capability, much work remains.  The National Security Strategy for 
Combating Weapons of Mass Destruction, The National Military Strategy for Combating 
Weapons of Mass Destruction, and Joint Publication 3-40, Joint Doctrine for Combating 
Weapons of Mass Destruction, all provide a sound strategic framework for combating 
WMD.  Significant gaps, however, remain at the operational and tactical levels also.  
While these gaps may narrow as the SCC-WMD and the 20th Support Command 
(CBRNE) continue to refine the operational and tactical aspects of the mission, they 
currently serve as an impediment to the successful conduction of the elimination mission.   
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3. Integrate WMD Elimination at the Strategic, Operational, and 
Tactical Levels. 
In order to establish a viable WMD elimination capability, this thesis recommends 
that DoD integrate the mission at strategic, operational, and tactical levels.  DoD must 
provide the appropriate focus for combatant commanders by integrating the elimination 
mission into the deliberate planning process and including it as part of the strategic and 
contingency planning guidance.146  At the strategic level, DoD must incorporate the 
elimination mission into its military transformation strategy.  Of the four transformation 
pillars, “concept development and experimentation” is particularly important given the 
novelty of the mission and high probability that future U.S. adversaries will possess 
WMD.  It should also share concept development with allies, encouraging them to 
develop a similar capability to facilitate combined operations.   
Furthermore, the United States should encourage the United Nations to maintain 
and expand its verification capability that was born out of United Nations Security 
Council Resolution 689.  A standing UN capability to conduct compliance verification 
can increase the confidence of member-state in UN-led verification operations and avoid 
many of the problems that plagued UNSCOM.  A permanent UN verification capability 
could also support phase III of WMD elimination by conducting continuous monitoring 
and ongoing inspections during phase III of WMD elimination.   
At the operational level, DoD must ensure that WMD elimination scenarios are 
included in major operational-level command post exercises (CPX).  Exercises such as 
Ulchi Focus Lens and various NATO exercises provide a two-fold opportunity.  They 
allow DoD to exercise it contingency plans for conducting WMD elimination operations 
and also provide exposure of mission to allies participating in these combined forces 
exercises.  Additionally, it is important that the elimination capability participate in 
combined arms exercises at the tactical level.  This will increase awareness of the WMD 
elimination capability amongst maneuver commanders and provide them with a better 
understanding of the purpose of WMD elimination.   
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4. Do Not Underestimate the Importance of Interpreter Support. 
DoD must ensure that adequate interpreter support is allocated for the WMD 
elimination capability during elimination operation.  It is particularly important during 
the exploitation phase of the operation when search teams must leverage every advantage 
possible.  Interpreter support is critical to both a site-centric and program-centric 
approaches to WMD elimination.  It serves to facilitate the production of actionable 
intelligence by screening documents, data, and material for collection during the 
exploitation phase.  Considering that the next adversary that DoD conducts WMD 
elimination against will present a much more formidable challenge, interpreter support 
should be a part of the “plug-and-play” structure of the 20th Support Command (CBRNE) 
and integrated into exercise scenarios where applicable.   
5. Incorporate the SALW Elimination Mission into the Mission Scope of 
the Permanent WMD Elimination Capability. 
DoD should expand the mission scope of the 20th Support Command to include 
SALW elimination.  The targeted weapons include both small arms manufactured to 
military specification and other light weapons such as antiaircraft ordnance, landmines, 
and rockets.  Peace enforcers’ inability to carry out proper SALW elimination is 
detrimental to the peace process.  
 Currently the Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA) conducts this mission.  
Nonetheless, considering its projected composition of explosive ordnance disposal assets 
and the crosscutting tasks involved in WMD and SALW elimination, the 20th Support 
Command could bolster DoD’s SALW elimination capability.  While DTRA conducts 
SALW under permissive conditions, the 20th Support Command could cover semi-
permissive or nonpermissive conditions.  This capability would be a value added asset to 
task force commanders during SSTR operations by providing an additional tool to nurture 
fragile peace arrangements. 
  
D. CONCLUSION 
Many potential adversaries of the United States either possess weapons of mass 
destruction or have the capacity to produce them.  When cooperative, nonproliferation 
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measures fail to rollback aggressor states’ WMD programs, DoD must have the capacity 
to compel compliance if called upon.  Even if WMD disarmament is not casus belli of a 
conflict, U.S. forces must still locate, establish positive control over, and/or destroy an 
adversary’s weapons program and stockpiles.  The intent of this thesis has been to 
substantiate the call for a permanent WMD elimination capability.  The argument 
supported by this thesis is that the United States cannot rely solely on UN-led, 
cooperative approaches to eliminate a determined adversary’s weapons program.  
Although non-coercive, cooperative approaches are preferred, the UN’s twelve-year 
verification effort in Iraq is evident that the threat of force must accompany these 
approaches.  To this end, a permanent WMD elimination capability may also serve as a 
deterrent to uncooperative aggressor states.  Additionally, the experiences gained during 
the OIF elimination mission demonstrate that an ad hoc approach to conducting this 
mission can have counterproductive consequences.  The lack of integrated training, 
inadequate prioritization resulting in unsecured sites, and misaligned intelligence assets 
are just a few of the problems that plagued the OIF search effort.  Considering the 
number of unsecured sites, unexploited documents, inaccurate intelligence assessments, 
and adroit use of improvised explosive devices by Iraqi insurgents, had Iraq actually 
possessed any WMD, the consequences would be devastating.   
The terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, heightened fears of a nexus between 
radicalism and technology.  Concerns that Iraq would transfer WMD material to terrorist 
organizations and the inability of the UN to verify that Iraq had complied with 
disarmament mandates contributed to the decision to invade Iraq.  Another contributing 
factor was the relative superiority of the U.S. military.  It became apparent, however, that 
although its forces were superior, WMD elimination was a new type of mission—one that 
no single organization in DoD’s force structure was aligned to accomplish.  To its credit, 
DoD has devised the most comprehensive strategy to combat weapons of mass 
destruction to date.  Both the National Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction 
and the National Military Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction present the 
comprehensive construct required to address the shortfall manifested by the post-
September 11 security era.  Additionally, the 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review 
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announced that DoD would consolidate its specialized assets to combat WMD under one 
formal command designated as the 20th Support Command (CBRNE).  The command 
will be responsible for leading future WMD elimination operations.  While this 
adequately addresses the initial problems that arose during the initial planning phase 
leading up to the invasion of Iraq, it will fall short of DoD’s strategic objectives.  DoD 
must also integrate WMD elimination into its mission scope.  It must make the mission a 
part of the deliberate planning cycle, include WMD elimination scenarios in major 
operational exercises, and incorporate it into the military transformation strategy.  DoD 
must also institutionalize WMD elimination as a core competency within the proponents 
responsible for conducting the critical tasks associated with the mission.  The U.S Army 
Chemical and Ordnance Corps must work closely with SSC-WMD as it continues to 
refine the operational aspects of WMD elimination.   
DoD has made great strides in its efforts to address the capability gap exposed by 
the Iraq elimination operation, but numerous challenges remain.  Employing the 
recommendations of this thesis to integrate and institutionalize the WMD elimination 
mission will create a synergistic effect and facilitate the establishment of a viable and 
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